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ARTICLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1937:
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE NEW
JURISPRUDENTIAL DEAL
Kurt T Lash*
INTRODUCTION
The story of the New Deal "switch in time that saved nine" is a
familiar tale. Prior to 1937, the Supreme Court had broadly rejected
both federal and state attempts to regulate the economy and provide
for the welfare of workers. Federal legislation was struck down as
beyond the federal commerce power.' State welfare regulations were
invalidated under the doctrine of liberty of contract.2  Tension
between the Court and the political branches reached a breaking
point during the Depression when the Court struck down critical
aspects of Roosevelt's New Deal.' Finally, in 1937, a single justice
changed his vote and a new majority of the Supreme Court initiated
the modem tradition of judicial deference to economic and social
welfare legislation.4 Some aspects of the story are still debated,
"Professor and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. A number
of people have helped this project along its way. I am particularly grateful for
Michael Kent Curtis's generous comments and suggestions, my colleague Larry
Solum's continuous encouragement throughout every stage of this project, and the
Loyola Law School faculty workshop program which provided me an important
venue for discussing the ideas contained in this paper.
1. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936): Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2- See Morehead v. New York ex reL Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. On a single day in 1935 the Court struck down the Frazier-Lemke Act which
provided mortgage relief to bankrupt farmers, denied the President power to replace
members of independent regulatory agencies, and invalidated the National Industrial
Recovery Act. See Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935). The next year, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, the National Bituminous Coal Act, and New York's minimum wage statute. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238(1936); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
4. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state minimum
wage law for women, and overruling Adkins); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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including whether the New Deal was a "constitutional moment"5 and
whether the Court's shift in doctrine was triggered by external
political events or an internal evolution of doctrine.6 Both the
traditional story and the debates, however, focus on the pre-1937
doctrines which stood in the way of the New Deal and the
abandonment of those doctrines (the switch in time) which allowed
the New Deal to proceed.7 The focus, in other words, is on the
political agenda of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
The New Deal Revolution, however, extended well beyond the
political goals of the New Deal Democrats. The same Court which
abandoned liberty of contract also launched the second most
significant doctrinal innovation of the twentieth century: selective
"incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 Although the Lochner Court protected freedom of
5. Compare Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Foundations] and Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations
(1998) [hereinafter Ackerman, Transformations] (arguing that the New Deal was a
legitimate constitutional revolution) with Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998) (arguing that the New
Deal revolution was more an evolutionary development of doctrine).
6. Externalists believe politics forced the change-that it was in fact a political
decision, rather than a matter of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Laura
Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (1996); William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt
(1995) [hereinafter Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court Reborn]. Internalists, on the other
hand, argue the shift was jurisprudential and occurred gradually over time, reflecting
an evolving understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 5, at 4-
5; Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes
Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994). Internalist
Barry Cushman points out the Court began as early as 1934 in Nebbia v. New York to
abandon the public/private distinction which drove most of the commerce regulation
jurisprudence (government may regulate only those businesses pressed with the
public interest). See Cushman, supra note 5, at 154-55. Externalists, on the other
hand, point out that Nebbia deployed the general framework of Lochner which
required heightened judicial scrutiny, and therefore special justification, for
government regulation of the economy. This approach was not abandoned until 1937.
See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 359-82. For a general discussion of
the internalist/externalist debate, see Symposium, Moments of Change:
Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108 Yale L.J. 1917 (1999) [hereinafter
Symposium, Moments of Change], which presents a number of articles representing
both the externalist and internalist perspectives on the New Deal.
7. Barry Cushman, for example, argues that the real revolution occurred in 1934
when the Court abandoned the public/private distinction in Nebbia-a move that
would allow for much of the New Deal agenda. See Cushman, supra note 5, at 7, 154-
55. Bruce Ackerman emphasizes the importance of Justice Roberts switching his vote
in 1937 but argues that, even after 1937, Roosevelt's victory was tenuous and was not
assured until the unanimous votes in United States v. Darby and Wickard v. Filburn.
See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 373; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Both Cushman and
Ackerman assume the central issue in the New Deal revolution involves the moment
when it became clear the Court no longer would pose a serious threat to New Deal
legislation.
8. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment originally was intended to incorporate
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speech and other rights along with liberty of contract, that Court
expressly rejected any necessary relationship between fundamental
rights and the specific texts of the Bill of Rights. The Court spoke of
"absorbing" texts of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment for the first time in 1937, the same year the Court
abandoned liberty of contract.9
Other legal "revolutions" of the New Deal period seem even
farther removed from the political context of the New Deal. In 1938,
the Court on its own initiative reversed the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
and restored state autonomy over its own common law.'" Erie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins had nothing to do with nationalism,
redistribution, or any other part of the New Deal political agenda." It
too, however, was revolutionary.' Finally, one additional doctrinal
innovation of the New Deal Revolution until now has gone entirely
unnoticed. The New Deal Court not only abandoned liberty of
contract, it also abandoned the parental rights jurisprudence of Meyer
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'3 As of 1937, parental
autonomy disappeared from the list of liberties protected under the
Due Process Clause 4 and did not reappear, despite numerous
opportunities for the Court to invoke the right, until the 1960s, long
after the New Deal. 5
The Court's treatment of parental rights calls into question the
standard reading of Carolene Products Footnote Four,t which
traditionally is interpreted as the decision which bifurcates due
some or all of the Bill of Rights has been the subject of an ongoing debate since the
New Deal-a significant fact in itself which I address in this article. See discussion
infra Part III. For general scholarship on the incorporation debate see sources cited
infra notes 26, 28.
9. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The first clearly articulated
doctrine of incorporation, the Preferred Freedoms Doctrine, emerged in 1939. See
Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942). See generally' discussion infra Part
III.B.
10. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842).
11. In a book written before he joined the Court, Robert Jackson wrote that the
decision in Erie "was not impelled by 'supervening economic events,' nor was it a part
of the program of any political party." Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle For Judicial
Supremacy 273 (1941).
12. For a discussion regarding the importance of Erie, see Henry J. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev. 383 (1964).
A number of aspects of the Court decision in Erie have been criticized. See, e.g., John
H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974) [hereinafter Ely,
Irrepressible Myth]; Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673 (1998). There is no doubt, however, that Erie was
viewed at the time as a revolutionary decision. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 272
(referring to Erie as "[p]erhaps the most remarkable decision of this period and in
some respects one of the most remarkable in the Court's history").
13. See infra Part II.F.
14. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
15. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J.. dissenting).
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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process into economic and personal liberties.1 7  Regarded as the
harbinger of the Court's ultimate incorporation project, this approach
links incorporation to the politically progressive themes of national
government and post-Lochner personal freedom. The New Deal
Court, however, treated the economic liberty of contract and the
personal liberty of parental autonomy with equal disregard. 8 The
political "bifurcation" explanation of Footnote Four cannot explain
the disappearance of parental autonomy.
Viewing the New Deal through a purely political lens obscures both
the variety and the nature of the jurisprudential changes which
occurred during this period. The rejection of Lochner, the retreat
from Tenth Amendment limits on the Commerce Clause, the rise of
Incorporation Doctrine, the rejection of parental rights, and the new
deference to state common law-all of these are aspects of a singular
effort by the New Deal Court to restructure the theory of judicial
review. From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the New Deal
Revolution was not about embracing Rooseveltian Progressivism, it
was about reestablishing the legitimacy of judicial review in the
modem world.
The New Deal justices appointed by Roosevelt brought to the
Court a simple mandate-they were to put an end to the "tortured
construction" of the Constitution that prevented the enactment of
New Deal legislation. 19 Just how this was to be accomplished was left
to the justices themselves. Acting, in effect, as a constitutional
convention, the New Deal Court had the responsibility to draft the
17. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 369 (describing Footnote Four as
distinguishing between "ordinary economic disputes" and matters involving political
rights and "discreet and insular minorities"); see also id. at 370 (contending the
Court's decision in Erie indicated that "the great sin of the Lochnerian era was the
Court's effort to constitutionalize the categories of the common law"); id. at 372
(stating that Erie was silent on the issue of what were legitimate grounds for judicial
review in the New Deal era).
18. It is not enough to say Meyer and Pierce were never reversed. Neither, of
course, was Lochner. The abandonment of Lochnerian liberty of contract was clear
from the Court's decisions in cases where liberty of contract previously would have
played a central role, as in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, and the absence of such liberty
from the list of rights the Court subsequently asserted it would henceforth protect
against political majorities. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153. Finally, the Court's emphasis on textual rights in
cases like Palko, Carolene Products, and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette
clearly distinguished liberty of contract from the Court's post-1937 individual rights
jurisprudence. See infra notes 109-11, 113-18, 211 and accompanying text. All of these
same moves occurred in regard to parental rights. See infra notes 154-57 and
accompanying text.
19. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearing on S. 1392 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 43 (1937) (statement of the Honorable Robert H.
Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States) ("Judges who resort to a
tortured construction of the Constitution may torture an amendment. You cannot
amend a state of mind and mental attitude of hostility to exercise of governmental
power .... "); see infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
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charter for post-New Deal judicial review. Unanimously rejecting the
common law method of Lochner and Swift,"-' the members of this New
Deal Convention declared that judicial interference with the political
process henceforth required, at the very least, some clear textual
justification. The rejection of Lochnerian liberty of contract, the rise
of textual incorporation theory, the disappearance of non-textual
parental rights, and the rejection of federal court construction of state
common law all reflect this same basic point.
The principles underlying this revolution in jurisprudence
emphasized constitutional text and an interpretive method based
upon the original meaning of the Constitution. 1 Federal power to
regulate commerce was now linked to the "original" views of John
Marshall.2 Non-textual liberties like freedom of contract and
parental rights were discarded and the newly articulated theory of
textual incorporation replaced the common law method of Lochner.Z
Unwilling to embrace the logical end of textual incorporation theory
(total incorporation), rough consensus emerged around the theory of
"Preferred Freedoms," a theory which limited incorporation to those
texts in the Bill of Rights of particular importance to the Founders."
The New Deal Revolution constructed by the Supreme Court
transcended politics. In its struggle to provide a principled account of
post-Lochner judicial review, the Supreme Court altered the shape of
judicial review and in doing so altered the shape of the Constitution.
20. Darby, Wickard and Erie all were unanimous opinions.
21. Modem theories of originalism tend to distinguish "original meaning" from
"original intent." See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2001): Antonin Scalia, Conmnon-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law Systen: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). There is a longstanding debate regarding the normative
attractiveness and proper methodology of originalism. For proponents, see Scalia,
supra; Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning. Original
Intent, and Judicial Review (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalisin For
Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Originalism]; and
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 233 (1988). See also Robert
H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 145 (1990).
For critiques, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 359-69 (1986); Paul Brest, Tie
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L Rev. 885
(1985); and Mark V. Tushnet, Following tie Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretevism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L Rev. 781 (1983).
This paper will not address either the legitimacy or the methodology of
original meaning analysis. My purpose is to explore jurisprudential choices of the
New Deal Court. Whatever the appropriate role or methodology of originalism, the
justices of the New Deal Convention expressly grounded much of the revolution upon
text and what they claimed was the original meaning of the Constitution.
22. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942): United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See infra Parts III.B, D-E.
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With a modern Supreme Court more willing than any of its
predecessors to question the legitimacy and scope of the New Deal, it
is more critical than ever that we understand the nature and scope of
the New Deal Revolution. Just as the records of the Philadelphia
Convention play an important role in our understanding of the
Founding, so should the records of the New Deal "Convention" of
1937 play a critical role in our understanding of the New
Jurisprudential Deal.
Part I traces the evolution of individual rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment in the period between 1868 and 1937. Although liberty
of contract is associated with the Lochner Court, economic rights like
labor and trade have their roots in mid-nineteenth century common
law. There is evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment anticipated such liberties would be protected under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Temporarily blocked by the Court's restricted reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases, however,
economic liberties eventually were identified as common law rights
protected under the Due Process Clause. Substantive Due Process
rights during the Lochner period went beyond economic liberties,
however, and included freedom of speech, press and parental
autonomy. Following the methodology of Lochner and Twining v.
New Jersey, the Court explained its efforts as identifying fundamental
aspects of the common law. Under this approach, the fact that speech
and press were listed in the text of the Bill of Rights was irrelevant to
enforcement as a due process liberty.
Part II addresses the impact of the New Deal Revolution on the
protection of individual rights. Roosevelt's appointees to the
Supreme Court arrived with the task of constructing a revolution
without the benefit of a constitutional amendment. Lacking a textual
mandate, the Court embarked on a revolution of jurisprudence-the
construction of a new and more legitimate approach to judicial review.
The core principle of this jurisprudential revolution was the embrace
of textual originalism. Regardless of its history as a common law
right, liberty of contract was nowhere mentioned in the text of the
Constitution and therefore could not be a legitimate ground for
interfering in the political process. Similarly, the Tenth Amendment
contained no express restrictions on the powers of Congress, but stood
as "a mere truism" regarding the reserved powers of the States. No
longer constrained by an unjustifiably broad reading of the Tenth
Amendment, the Court returned interpretation of the commerce
power to what it claimed was the original understanding of the
Founders.
The New Deal's jurisprudential revolution went well beyond the
transient political goals of the New Deal Democrats. At the same
time the Court abandoned common law liberty of contract, it also
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abandoned judicial construction of state common law in Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins. De-coupling judicial review from the
common law methodology of the nineteenth century had additional
consequences. If the error of Lochnerian liberty of contract was its
lack of textual foundation, then Lochnerian parental autonomy shared
the same error. In order to survive the New Deal Revolution,
decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters would
have to be recharacterized to represent judicial protection of textual
rights like religious freedom and equal protection under the law. As
of 1937, parental rights disappeared from the due process
jurisprudence of the New Deal Court.
In Part III, I explore the birth and evolution of the Incorporation
Doctrine. Prior to 1937, there had been no reason to speak of
incorporating the "texts" of the First Amendment because liberties
like speech and press were protected as fundamental liberties under
the common law. The fact that they were (or were not) mentioned in
the Bill of Rights was irrelevant. The abandonment of common law
methodology and the new emphasis on textual originalism required a
new justification for the enforcement of individual rights, including
those of speech and press. In the period between 1937 and 1947, the
justices debated various approaches to post-Lochner judicial review.
Justice Felix Frankfurter advocated a political process model in which
the Court generally deferred to the political branches except in
situations involving equal access to the levers of political reform.
Adopted by a majority of the Court in the first years of the New Deal,
Frankfurter's Political Process model was soon displaced by the
Preferred Freedoms model in which some, but not all, of the texts of
the Bill of Rights were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Choosing selective over total textual incorporation, however, raised a
host of difficult issues for the New Deal Court. The famous
incorporation debates between Justices Frankfurter and Black are, in
fact, debates over the meaning of the New Deal. Both Frankfurter
and Black understood the central purpose of the Revolution was to
establish a principled method of constitutional interpretation in a
world which had rejected the common law methodology of Lochner.
In this new world, judicial review revolved around text and original
meaning. Their disagreement over the nature of due process triggered
the first serious investigation of the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment since the Slaughterhouse Cases.
In Part IV, I explore the implications of vieing the New Deal
Revolution as a revolution in jurisprudence. First, whatever the
political goals of the New Deal Democrats, they were not the stated
goals of the New Deal Court. Instead of constitutionalizing
Rooseveltian Progressivism, the Court self-consciously placed both
laissez-faire capitalism and progressive redistributionism within the
legitimate reach of the political process. Efforts to define the New
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Deal Revolution in terms of progressive politics, thus, is at odds with
the original intentions of the New Deal Court. Secondly, the New
Deal emphasis on textual originalism conflicts with both the modern
embrace of non-textual common law rights like privacy and parental
autonomy, and with the increasing use of federalism principles as a
substantive limit on the otherwise plenary powers of Congress. If one
embraces the New Deal as a "constitutional moment," it appears one
must reject both non-textual due process liberties and non-textual
federalist restraints on federal power.
I. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PRIOR TO 1937
The Lochner Court embraced both freedom of contract and
freedom of speech as liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' Although the modem Court continues
to protect freedom of speech as a Due Process liberty, most legal
historians today believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
the intended vehicle for protecting individual rights against state
action.26 The Privileges or Immunities Clause, however, likely was
intended to protect common law economic rights, as well as rights like
freedom of speech and religion. Appreciating the common roots of
economic liberties and modern incorporated rights is critical to
understanding the dilemma faced by the New Deal Court. If
enforcing liberty of contract was no less-and no more-legitimate
than enforcing freedom of speech, then what interpretive
methodology justifies enforcement of one and not the other?
25. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
26. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998)
[hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights]; Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986) [hereinafter Curtis, No State];
Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights
Against States?, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 443 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992); Richard L. Aynes,
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 57 (1993)
[hereinafter Aynes, Misreading John Bingham]. For additional arguments suggesting
the significance of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 22-30 (1980); William Winslow
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations
on State Authority, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954); and Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges
or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 405.
Justice Hugo Black also suggested a new look at the Privileges or Immunities Clause
in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Even if not
all modern scholars are convinced about the original intent to incorporate the Bill of
Rights by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, I am not aware of a single
scholar who argues that the framers intended the Due Process Clause to be the
vehicle for incorporation.
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A. The Origins of Economic Rights
The Privileges or Immunities Clause declares that "[njo state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."2'7 There is a growing
body of literature suggesting that this phrase was intended to include
some, if not all, of the first eight amendments to the Constitution. -'
Whether one is persuaded by this argument, 9 the same evidence
suggests that privileges or immunities were understood to include
more than just the first eight amendments.-' Justice Bushrod
Washington described the right to pursue a trade as a privilege and
immunity protected by Article IV." According to Justice
Washington, whose opinion in Corfield was used throughout the
Reconstruction debates in Congress,"2 privileges and immunities of
citizenship included "[tihe right of a citizen in one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.- ' The status of
economic rights was particularly important to mid-nineteenth century
Republicans. The slogan of the Republican Party in 1856 and 1860
27. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although rendered close to a dead letter in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court recently has signaled a renewed interest in
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
28. See sources cited supra note 26. For an opposing view see Raoul Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1989) [hereinafter Berger, Fourteenth
Amendment]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's
Wishing Well, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1993); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill
of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 435 (1981)
[hereinafter Berger, Nine-Lived Cat]; Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor
Crosskey, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 144 (1954) [hereinafter Fairman, Reply]: Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L
Rev. 5 (1949) [hereinafter Fairman, Fourteenth Anendment].
29. I believe the evidence does support such a conclusion. See Kurt T. Lash,
Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1069 (1998) [hereinafter Lash,
Power and Religion]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause:
The Rise of the Nonestablishinent Principle, 27 Ariz. St. LJ. 1085 (1995); Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under tie
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Free
Exercise Clause].
30. See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993); Alfred Alvins, Freedom of Choice
in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on
Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 Cornell L.Q. 228 (1964); Alfred Alvins, The Right
to Work and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 18 Lab. L.J. 15
(1967); Alan Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Sourer and tile
Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 3 (1999); Jeffrey
Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1241
(1998).
31. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
32. See Curtis, No State, supra note 26, at 73; Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26,
at 178.
33. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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demanded free speech, free soil, free labor and free men. Following
the Civil War, protecting economic rights was a major part of the
Reconstruction agenda. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, widely
regarded as the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed
to "citizens[] of every race and color.., the same right... as is
enjoyed by white citizens... to make and enforce contracts,...
purchase [and] ... sell.., property, and to [receive the] full and equal
benefit of all laws... for the security of person and property."3"
Finally, the same views were shared by those who played important
roles in shaping the Fourteenth Amendment. John Bingham, framer
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, insisted that "[t]he
equality of all to the right to... work and enjoy the product of their
toil" was a privilege of United States citizenship.36 Obviously,
economic liberty-the right to earn bread by the sweat of your brow-
had a special resonance to those who had opposed slavery.37
Protection of these rights, however, was not limited to situations
involving racial discrimination. The abridgment of civil rights that
occurred under slavery extended to whites and blacks, a fact that
eventually galvanized northern opposition to slavery. 8
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, a majority of the Supreme Court
rejected both incorporation of the Bill of Rights and protection of
fundamental economic rights as privileges or immunities. 9
Dissenting, Justice Field argued that economic rights were among the
privileges or immunities of United States citizens which states may not
34. See Richard Sewell, Ballots for Freedom 284 (1976).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1994)).
36. Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
see also Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (1857) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(stating that equality "protects not only life and liberty, but also property, the product
of labor.... [and] contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit
of his toil any more than of his life"). Bingham also indicated that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause included more than just the Bill of Rights. According to Bingham,
"the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished
from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis added). But see Michael Kent Curtis, Two
Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey Rosen's Paper, 66 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1269, 1284, 1291 (1998) [hereinafter Curtis, Thoughts] (arguing that members of
the thirty-ninth Congress expressed a variety of views regarding the right to contract
and own property, and that more research needs to be done).
37. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in Inaugural
Addresses of the Presidents of the United States 142 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office
1989).
38. Michael Curtis points out that the Fourteenth Amendment was not just about
racial discrimination, but also was intended to respond to the suppression of civil
liberties of whites and blacks. See Curtis, Thoughts, supra note 36, at 1275.
39. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). Prior to the Slaughterhouse
Cases, a lower federal court twice had ruled the Bill of Rights was protected under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. See United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); United States v. Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).
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abridge.4 Justice Bradley, in his dissent, argued that both Justice
Washington's list in Corfield, and rights such as those listed in the
First Amendment, were "privileges or immunities" of United States
citizens.41 In embracing Corfield and economic liberty, Field and
Bradley anticipated Lochnerian freedom of contract.4 2
40. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 97 ("The privileges and immunities
designated are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments.
Clearly among these must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employment in a
lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally affects all persons."), see
also id. at 106 ("There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue
unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less than
the sacred right of labor." (internal quotes omitted)).
41. Justice Bradley wrote:
But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated, although they
were only secured, in express terms, from invasion by the Federal
government; such as the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of
free exercise of religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press,
the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public measures, the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and above all,
and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. These, and still others are
specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amendments of it, as
among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or,
what is still stronger for the force of the argument, the rights of all persons,
whether citizens or not. But even if the Constitution were silent, the
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as such, would be no less
real and no less inviolable than they now are. It was not necessary to say in
words that the citizens of the United States should have and exercise all the
privileges of citizens; the privilege of buying, selling, and enjoying property;
the privilege of engaging in any lawful employment for a livelihood; the
privilege of resorting to the laws for redress of injuries, and the like. Their
very citizenship conferred these privileges, if they did not possess them
before.
Id. at 118-19.
42. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910,
at 64 (1995); Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendnent Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?: The Judicial Interpretation, 2 Stan. L Rev. 140, 172 n.63 (1949): Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendnent, 61 Ohio
St. L.J. 1051, 1091-92 (2000).
Michael Curtis has tentatively argued against reading economic liberties into
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting tie
Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughterhouse Cases Without
Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendennt, 38 B.C. L Rev.
1, 3 (1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or hnmunities Clause].
First, Curtis argues that many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
want to totally destroy the independent character of the states, something which
would be threatened by economic liberty protections A la Lochner. See id. at 101-02.
Secondly, Curtis notes that the Equal Protection Clause most likely was intended to
protect against invidious classifications like race, religion and ethnicity, but not
against economic classifications. See id. at 82. Third, the Republicans intended to
protect suspect classes like African Americans in the South. See id. at 37. Thus,
according to Curtis, it would be ironic to interpret the meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in a manner that advantages corporate power over the relatively
weak individual. Id. at 99. Fourth, to whatever extent wealth-based classifications
were thought inappropriate in 1868, that view was rejected with the passage of the
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Judicial enforcement of common law economic rights fits
comfortably within the common law approach to individual liberty
that dominated nineteenth century jurisprudence.43  Lochnerian
concerns about class legislation were common in mid-nineteenth
century America.' Laws taking property away from A and giving it
Sixteenth Amendment which made room for the progressive income tax and wealth
redistribution. Id. at 92. Finally, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely
would have agreed with progressives who later would characterize economic
exploitation as a form of slavery. See id. at 99.
Acknowledging that these are merely tentative arguments, a brief response
nevertheless is in order. First, Curtis seems to downplay the role free contract/free
labor played in the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As I point out above, there is clear textual and historical support for
fundamental economic rights-at least the protection against unreasonable economic
classifications. Secondly, there is no more reason to eschew "liberty of contract" for
federalism reasons than there is to eschew incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
Enforcement of either set of liberties would rework the relationship between the
federal governments and the states. Indeed, the greater threat to the states in 1868
would have been protection of liberties like free speech, free press and equal
protection. Including economic liberties would not have raised serious state concerns
since broad state regulation of the economy remained years in the future. In other
words, no one in 1868 would likely have viewed protection of liberty of contract as
any more of a reworking of federalism than any other "incorporated" right.
In regard to Curtis's attempt to limit equal protection to certain suspect or
invidious classifications, certainly race discrimination was a Republican target. But
there is no reason to think Republicans would have viewed class warfare-based
discrimination as non-invidious. See Rosen, supra note 30, at 1263. At the very least,
Republicans believed the Equal Protection Clause would forbid unreasonable
discrimination, and judicial review of economic legislation was as fair game as any
other area of law used by the southern states to disadvantage blacks and suppress
dissent.
As far as the "Progressive" impact of the Sixteenth Amendment is concerned,
to date no one has undertaken to show that the original intent behind the Sixteenth
Amendment was broad enough to invalidate Lochnerian economic rights. There is no
textual reason to read the Sixteenth Amendment as changing anything outside the
area of taxation. Nor am I aware of any scholarship suggesting that the drafters of the
Sixteenth Amendment (or even later members of the New Deal Court) believed its
impact extended to liberty of contract. In this regard, the Sixteenth is more like a
"superstatute" than a transformative amendment. See Ackerman, Foundations, supra
note 5, at 91.
Finally, regarding the "slavery" of economic exploitation: It is anachronistic to
read later economic concerns as affecting public understanding of privileges or
immunities in 1868. In the end, Curtis's arguments seem more pragmatic than
historical. Indeed, he is willing to abandon originalist understanding of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause if such an approach leads to Lochner. Curtis, Thoughts, supra
note 36, at 1290-92. To a comprehensive originalist, however, whether such an
account would lead to the restoration of Lochner depends on the constitutional status
of the New Deal Revolution. Presumably, "The People" could have embraced liberty
of contract in 1868, but rejected it in 1937.
43. See Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 340
(1992) [hereinafter Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction] ("Freedom of contract is
deeply entrenched in the Free Labor and Abolitionist sources of the Reconstruction
Amendments, with roots that run as deep as the Enlightenment and Commonwealth
ideas that provide the interpretive context for the Founding Bill of Rights.").
44. See Rosen, supra note 30, at 1263.
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to B were as unreasonable as laws regulating contract and property on
the basis of race. 5 According to Thomas Cooley,
[t]he general rule is that every person sui juris has a right to choose
his own employment, and to devote his labor to any calling, or at his
option to hire it out in the service of others. This is one of the first
and highest of all civil rights, and any restrictions that discriminate
against persons or classes are inadmissible.46
Although development of economic rights under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was cut off by the Slaughterhouse Cases,4 7 those
same common law rights eventually were embraced by the Lochner
Court as aspects of liberty protected under the Due Process Clause.
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,4I Justice Peckham declared:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means, not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.4 9
45. See id. (stating that "Reconstruction-era Republicans repeatedly invoked two
different models of impermissible classification-a prohibition on class legislation and
an anti-caste principle .... [R]egulation in the public interest was permissible, but...
redistributive regulations, which take property away from A and give it to B, were
inherently suspect"); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public Choice, and the
Structural Constitution, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 181, 183 (1997) (citing Gillman,
supra note 30, at 33-45).
46. Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United
States of America 231 (1880) (emphasis omitted); see also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578, 591 (1897) ("In the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of
acquiring, holding, and selling property must be embraced the right to make all
proper contracts in relation thereto.").
47. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
48. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
49. Id. at 589. Continuing, Peckham cited Justice Bradley's concurrence in
Butchers' Union Company v. Crescent City
, 
Compani:
The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an
inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the phrase "pursuit of
happiness" in the Declaration of Independence, which commenced with the
fundamental proposition that "all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." This right is a large ingredient
in the civil liberty of the citizen. Again, [at 111 U.S. 764] the learned justice
said: "I hold that the liberty of pursuit-the right to follow any of the
ordinary callings of life-is one of the privileges of a citizen of the United
States." And again, [at 111 U.S. 765]: "But if it does not abridge the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States to prohibit him
from pursuing his chosen calling, and giving to others the exclusive right of
pursuing it, it certainly does deprive him (to a certain extent) of his liberty;
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Having elevated the common law freedom of contract to protected
liberty status in Allgeyer, Peckham and the Court vigorously enforced
that right against state attempts to enact wage and hour legislation,
the most (in)famous example being Lochner v. New York.5 ° Although
currently associated with a disfavored approach to judicial review,
freedom of contract had plausible roots in the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and was but one example of a number of
individual liberties protected by the Lochner Court.
B. Non-Economic Common Law Rights
The Lochner Court did not limit liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment to economic rights. The same year the Court stuck down
the minimum wage in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,51 it also struck
down a state law prohibiting schools from teaching German in Meyer
v. Nebraska." Although Meyer involved a religious school, 3 the
Court did not base its decision on religious liberty. Instead, the Court
invoked the right to acquire useful knowledge and the right of parents
to control the education of their children54 -rights derived in the same
for it takes from him the freedom of adopting and following the pursuit
which he prefers; which, as already intimated, is a material part of the liberty
of the citizen." It is true that these remarks were made in regard to
questions of monopoly, but they well describe the rights which are covered
by the word "liberty" as contained in the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 589-90 (quoting Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762,
764, 765 (1883) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
50. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). The Court stated:
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.... Under that provision no State can deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment,
unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.
Id. (citation omitted)).
51. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Felix Frankfurter represented the appellants.
52. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
53. The school was Lutheran. See id. at 397.
54. See id. at 400. The Court stated: "Plaintiff in error taught this language in
school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the
Amendment." Id. The Court further stated:
The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently
promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares, "Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to
give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the
States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws ....
Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the
calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to
acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education
of their own.
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manner as liberty of contract.51 Justice McReynolds for the majority
explained that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.56
This right had the same status as liberty of contract and was derived
by the same principle which protected all "privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." To support his conclusion, McReynolds cited the
Slaughterhouse Cases, Allgeyer, Lochner, Twining and Adkins."
Meyer became an important touchstone for the Lochner Court; later,
when liberty of contract came under assault, the pro-Lochner
dissenters cited Meyer in support of freedom of contract.5s
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 the Court relied on
Meyer to strike down the state of Oregon's attempt to require a public
school education. According to the Court, "[u]nder the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska,... we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."'
As was true for freedom of contract, this liberty was derived not from
the text but from "privileges long recognized at common law."
Neither Meyer nor Pierce focused on religious liberty or ethnic
discrimination, much less spoke of incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause; Pierce did not mention religious liberty at all.61
Id. at 400-01.
55. See id at 399.
56. 1&
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 547 (1934) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
59. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Justice McReynolds wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. The plaintiffs in Pierce were a Catholic parochial school and a secular military
academy. See id. at 531-32.
473
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C. The Bill of Rights Under Lochner
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against National action may also be
safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be
a denial of due process of law.... If this is so, it is not because those
rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because
they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of
due process of law.62
- Twining v. New Jersey (1908)
The Doctrine of Incorporation as such did not exist prior to 1937.
Cases involving freedom of speech, press and religion were decided
according to the common law methodology of cases like Allgeyer,
Lochner and Twining. Although the Court occasionally construed
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to include a right expressly
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, the Court went out of its way to
separate considerations of due process from textual inclusion of the
Bill. In Twining (1908), the Court turned aside a claim that provisions
of the Bill of Rights were necessarily aspects of either the Privileges or
Immunities or Due Process Clauses.63 Even if the Court had
protected aspects of the first eight Amendments, "it is not because
those rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but
because they are of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law."' The definition of due process was
to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion
in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise."65
The Court's common law approach to identifying "liberty" did not
give any degree of priority to the textual provisions of the Bill of
Rights. In 1897, the Court identified liberty of contract and just
compensation as aspects of due process liberty-in that order.' In
1908, the Twining Court rejected the textual right against self-
incrimination.67 In 1923, the Court protected the non-textual liberty
of contract in Adkins' and parental rights in Meyer.69 In 1925, the
Court relied upon Twining and Meyer to support its conclusion "that
freedom of speech and of the press... are among the fundamental
62. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (Moody, J.).
63. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (rejecting the right against self-
incrimination as a fundamental due process right).
64. Id. at 99-100.
65. Id. at 100.
66. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (protecting liberty of contract);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(protecting the right to just compensation).
67. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
68. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
69. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."7' In
1932, the Court again relied upon the Twining formula and read the
Due Process Clause to require a fair trial which, in this case, required
the assistance of counsel.7 In the 1936 case Grosjean v. American
Press Company,' the Court cited Allgeyer-the seminal liberty of
contract case-in support of its declaration that "freedom of speech
and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character,
safeguarded by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'73
At no time did the court refer to "incorporation," or, as would
Justice Cardozo years later, to "a process of absorption."'7 Freedom
of contract was not fundamentally different from freedom of speech;
neither was absorbed. They were both identified as fundamental
liberties at common law. What mattered was following the common
law doctrinal approach of Allgeyer and Twining. Textual reference in
the Bill was irrelevant.
II. THE NEW DEAL TRANSFORMATION
They had become legislators, not jurists. They had taken into their
own hands the right of self-government for which our colonial
ancestors fought a long-drawn-out war against Great Britain; and
while no British court can supersede an act of Parliament, the
descendants of those who once fought Britain for legislative liberty
have found that liberty deftly stolen from their hands.
-The Nine Old Men (1937).
[T]he immediate difficulty was with the Justices, not the Court or
the Constitution.76
-Robert Jackson, The Struggle For Judicial Supremacy (1941).
70. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
71. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (due process requires a fair trial,
which in the capital punishment case before the state court, required assistance of
counsel); see id. at 67-68 (stating that if some of the first eight Amendments are
considered aspects of due process liberty "it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that
they are included in the conception of due process of law" (quoting Twining, 211 U.S.
at 99-100)).
72. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
73. ILd. at 244 ("The word 'liberty' contained in that amendment embraces not
only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in
the enjoyment of all his faculties as well." (citation omitted)).
74. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
75. Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, The Nine Old Men 72 (1937).
76. Jackson, supra note 11, at 180.
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The Supreme Court's battles with Roosevelt and the New Deal are
legendary. Prior to 1937, the Court occasionally had upheld
government regulation of labor and the economy. 7 Key aspects of
Roosevelt's first one hundred days legislation, however, were
invalidated by the Court. On a single day in 1935,7a in three
unanimous opinions, the Court struck down the Frazier-Lemke Act
which had provided mortgage relief to bankrupt farmers,7 9 denied the
President's power to replace members of independent regulatory
agencies,"0 and invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act.81
The next year, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment
Act," the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 3 and New York's
minimum wage statute.' The Court's interference with key aspects of
the New Deal infuriated the Democrats. According to Robert
Jackson:
[Alt the threshold of the New Deal the Court had established itself
as a Supreme Censor of legislation. It expanded the concept of "due
process," and tore it loose from its ancient connotations; it restricted
the concept of the power to regulate interstate commerce, and cut
down the significance which John Marshall had attributed to it.
With these instruments it approved or disapproved each law,
grudgingly giving consent to any departure from laissez faire, or to
any serious interference with the power of property and employers.
I do not mean to say that it never did give consent.... But this only
emphasizes the fact that the Court, and not the legislature, became
the final judge of what might be law .... 85
By 1937, Roosevelt had submitted his court packing plan,86 and
Congress itself was considering a number of constitutional
amendments which would allow the New Deal to proceed. Proposed
amendments fell along two main lines: those which sought to
restructure the nature of judicial review (for example, by providing for
a congressional override of judicial opinions),8 and those which
77. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); The Gold Clause Cases, 294
U.S. 240 (1935).
78. A day known as "Black Monday." See Oxford Companion to the Supreme
Court 75 (1992).
79. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
80. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
81. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
82. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
83. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
84. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
85. Jackson, supra note 11, at 70.
86. Roosevelt proposed adding one justice for every Supreme Court justice over
age seventy. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Presents a Plan for the
Reorganization of the Judicial Bench of the Government (Feb. 5, 1937), in 6 The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, at 51-66 (Samuel
Rosenman ed., 1941) [hereinafter Roosevelt Public Papers]. For a general discussion
of the court packing plan, see Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 317.
87. Senators Burton Wheeler and Homer Bone proposed the following
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sought to increase the regulatory power of government (generally, by
permitting regulation of labor and the economy).' Some proposals
exempted judicial protection of liberties listed in the Bill of RightsY'
Justice Roberts's switch in time, of course, effectively put an end to
both the court packing plan and proposed constitutional
amendments.90
The national debate regarding the nature and scope of the New
Deal Revolution, however, did not end with the Court's decision in
amendment:
Section 1. In case the Supreme Court renders any judgment holding any Act
of Congress or any provision of any such Act unconstitutional, the question
with respect to the constitutionality of such Act or provision shall be
promptly submitted to the Congress for its action at the earliest practicable
date that the Congress is in session... : but no action shall be taken by the
Congress upon such question until an election shall have been held at which
Members of the House of Representatives are regularly by law to be chosen.
If such Act or provision is reenacted by two-thirds of each House of the
Congress to which such Members are elected at such election, such Act or
provision shall be deemed to be constitutional and effective from the date of
such reenactment.
SJ. Res. 80, 75th Cong, 1st Sess. (1937). Wheeler later proposed exempting decisions
involving the Bill of Rights from his amendment. See Reorganization of tile Federal
Judiciary: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 75th
Cong. 485, 500 (1937) (statement of Sen. Wheeler).
Presidential advisors Benjamin Cohen and Tommy Corcoran proposed a
constitutional amendment which would have allowed Congress to overrule a
constitutional decision of the Supreme Court by a two-thirds vote of each house or by
a simple majority if an election had intervened. See Benjamin V. Cohen & Thomas G.
Corcoran, Memorandum on Constitutional Problems, Cohen Papers, Library of
Congress (1937) (on file with the Fordhiam Law Review); see also William Lasser,
Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937- Was There a "Switch In
Time"?, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1347 (2000) (revieing Cushman, supra note 5).
88. Senator Henry Ashurst proposed an amendment to enable Congress "to
regulate agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor." Ackerman, Transformations,
supra note 5, at 338. Senator Edward Costigan proposed amendments which would
enable Congress to legislate for the general welfare where states could not effectively
do so; to enable Congress "to regulate hours and conditions of labor and to establish
minimum wages in any employment and to regulate production, industry, business,
trade, and commerce to prevent unfair methods and practices"; and to construe the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "to impose no
limitations upon legislation by the Congress or by the several states with respect to
any of the subjects referred to in section 1, except as to the methods or the procedure
for the enforcement of such legislation." See id. at 339. Senator Williams Borah
followed Costigans's amendment by proposing to add the following:
No state shall make or enforce any law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof- or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble- and
to petition the State or the Government for redress of grievances.
Id. at 339.
89. Senator Wheeler, for example, agreed that "[mjeasures violating the human
rights guaranteed in the first ten amendments... would be excepted, perhaps, in this
amendment." Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 332.
90. The switch is generally regarded as having occurred with the Court's
upholding of Washington State's minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. It was transferred to the Court. Over the
next several years, the justices struggled over various drafts of post-
Lochner judicial review. Momentum would swing first toward
restructuring the constitutional role of the Court. Under Felix
Frankfurter's political process approach, judicial intervention was
limited to ensuring the proper functioning of the democratic process.
Ultimately, consensus formed around an approach to constitutional
interpretation that emphasized the role of text and original intent in
interpreting the Constitution. This jurisprudence of textual
originalism explained the abandonment of Lochner and justified the
Court's continued role as protector of individual liberties under the
newly articulated Doctrine of Incorporation.
A. Judicial Methodology and the New Deal Court
Prior to 1937, majoritarian regulation of labor and the economy had
been the exception. Afterward, it became the rule. According to
Chief Justice Hughes, "[l]iberty under the Constitution is thus
necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process."'" Since the Court's
decision in Parrish, not a single commercial regulatory law has been
struck down as beyond Congress' commerce power. The Revolution
involved more than the initiation of a winning streak, however. The
New Deal Court abandoned an entire method of judicial review, and
did so in a manner that sent shock waves across numerous lines of
doctrine, including federal commerce power, taxing and spending,
state police power, individual rights and federal common law.' The
91. Id. at 391.
92. Some scholars have argued that the New Deal Revolution was less a
revolution and more a gradual evolution in doctrine-with roots prior to 1937. See
Cushman, supra note 5, at 84, 154 (arguing that Nebbia set the stage for 1937 cases
like Parrish). Professor Cushman, for example, maintains that Nebbia signaled the
end of judicial obstruction, the Court having abandoned the public/private distinction
marking the limits to government regulatory power. See id. Cushman's approach,
however, focuses on the doctrinal innovations necessary to uphold critical aspects of
the New Deal. This winloss approach to determining when the revolution occurred
downplays the role of judicial doctrine. The members of the Court, however, saw
matters quite differently: what counted was the Court's interpretive method. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
The problem was with the Court's methodology, not simply the win-loss
record of New Deal programs. This is why cases decided in favor of the New Deal
that nevertheless maintained the general pre-New Deal approach to judicial review
did not generate much in the way of dissent. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 363
(remarking on the "unrevolutionary" majority opinion in Jones & Laughlin). It was
only with the abandonment of Lochnerian methodology that the dissenters came out
with their guns blazing- they recognized a revolution in the making. See, e.g., Parrish,
300 U.S. at 400 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). For additional problems with Cushman's
internalist perspective, see supra note 6.
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dramatic upheaval called for an explanation. 3 Unable to justify the
change as the result of a constitutional amendment, the Court
embraced a new method of judicial review.
B. Changed Circumstances Doctrine
We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of
interstate commerce. 9
-Franklin D. Roosevelt (1935).
A common criticism of the Court prior to 1937, encouraged by
Roosevelt, 95 was its failure to consider the current economic
emergency in its interpretation of the Constitution." The importance
of considering prevailing circumstances in judicial construction of
statutes had been pressed for decades by jurists like Louis Brandeis,"
and some members of the pre-New Deal Court, who believed it
should apply to constitutional interpretation as well. The idea was
that the Constitution should adapt to changing circumstances. For
example, in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell," Chief
Justice Hughes led a majority to uphold a state debtor relief statute
against a claim that the law violated the Contract Clause. His opinion
not only rejected the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted
according to its original intent, it expressly found such intent to be
irrelevant:99
93. Roberts did not explain his vote in Jones & Laughlin or Parrish. Following
Justice Roberts's death, Justice Frankfurter published a memorandum Roberts had
sent to him which purported to explain why Roberts had voted to strike down the
program in Tipaldo after having upheld the program in Nebbia. In the memorandum,
Roberts explained that no one in Tipaldo had asked whether Adkins should be
overruled. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, in Of Law and Men 204 (Philip
Elman ed., 1956). Such a procedural nicety seems in conflict with Roberts's joining
the decision in Erie to strike down almost one hundred years of case law despite not
having been asked to do so by either litigant.
94. The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference (May 31, 1935), in 4 Roosevelt
Public Papers, supra note 86, at 221, 221; see also Self-Government We Must and
Shall Maintain-Address at Little Rock, Arkansas (June 10, 1936), in 5 Roosevelt
Public Papers, supra note 86, at 195, 200 (stating that the Constitution "is intended to
meet and to fit the amazing physical, economic and social requirements that confront
us in this modem generation").
95. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Address, Mar. 9. 1937, reprinted in
Jackson, supra note 11, at 340.
96. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the
Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-
Building, 11 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 191 (1997); G. Edward White, The "Constitutional
Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivi,, 48 Hastings L.J. 867 (1997).
97. See Muller v. Oregon. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Future-Justice Louis Brandeis
filed the brief in Muller.
98. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
99. See also Whittington, supra note 21, at 291 n.114 (noting Blaisdell's
"emergency" doctrine and Hughes's break from original intent).
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It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a
century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our
time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the
time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the
great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of
their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its
own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning-"We
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding[.]"
The vast body of law which has been developed was unknown to the
fathers, but it is believed to have preserved the essential content and
the spirit of the Constitution. With a growing recognition of public
needs and the relation of individual right to public security, the court
has sought to prevent the perversion of the clause through its use as
an instrument to throttle the capacity of the States to protect their
fundamental interests."'
In the critical year of 1937, the revolution began with Chief Justice
Hughes's opinion in Parrish. Repeating his analysis in Blaisdell,
Hughes cited new "economic conditions" as justification for reversing
Adkins and adopted the reasoning of Oliver Wendell Holmes.10'
100. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-44 (citation omitted). Although Hughes appeared to
back away from the changed circumstances argument in Schechter Poultry, he
returned to the same theme in Parrish. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
Blaisdell has been described as representing the dawn of "living Constitution"
jurisprudence. See Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 Yale L.J.
2165, 2186-87 [hereinafter Kalman, Law, Politics]; see also G. Edward White, The
Constitution and the New Deal: A Reassessment 199 (2000). The approach in
Blaisdell, however, was rejected by the New Deal Court. See infra Part II.C; see also
David A. Pepper, Note, Against Legalism: Rebutting An Anachronistic Account of
1937,82 Marq. L. Rev. 63, 146 (1998).
101. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,396-97 (1937). According to Hughes:
The statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Adkins case is pertinent: "This
statute does not compel anybody to pay anything. It simply forbids
employment at rates below those fixed as the minimum requirement of
health and right living. It is safe to assume that women will not be employed
at even the lowest wages allowed unless they earn them, or unless the
employer's business can sustain the burden. In short the law in its character
and operation is like hundreds of so-called police laws that have been
upheld."
Id. at 396-97 (quoting Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923)).
The dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes were regularly referred to
throughout this period as representing the appropriate approach to interpreting the
Constitution. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80, 85
(1938); Parrish, 300 U.S. at 396; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 46
(1937); see also Benjamin Cardozo, The Methods of History, Tradition and Sociology,
in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 138 (Margaret E. Hall ed.,
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Moving beyond the moral skepticism that informed Justice Holmes's
opinions, Hughes argued that the Constitution should not be read to
interfere with the moral duty of legislatures to protect vulnerable
workers from exploitation:
There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent
economic experience has brought into a strong light. The
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their
health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support
upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the
taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be
met. We may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for
relief which arose during the recent period of depression and still
continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic
recovery which has been achieved. It is unnecessary to cite official
statistics to establish what is of common knowledge through the
length and breadth of the land. While in the instant case no factual
brief has been presented, there is no reason to doubt that the State
of Washington has encountered the same social problem that is
present elsewhere. The community is not bound to provide what is
in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. The community
may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs
from their selfish disregard of the public interest'OC
The majority opinion in Parrish triggered a forceful dissent. After
obliquely accusing an unnamed justice of voting against his
conscience, 3 Justice Sutherland launched a blistering attack on the
majority's embrace of "changed circumstances" jurisprudence in
Matthew Bender 1967) (1947) ("It is the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes [in
Lochner], which men will turn to in the future as the beginning of an era.").
102. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 399-400.
103. Id. at 401-02 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland wrote:
It has been pointed out many times, as in the Adkins case, that this judicial
duty is one of gravity and delicacy; and that rational doubts must be resolved
in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. But whose doubts, and by
whom resolved? Undoubtedly it is the duty of a member of the court, in the
process of reaching a right conclusion, to give due weight to the opposing
views of his associates; but in the end, the question which he must answer is
not whether such views seem sound to those who entertain them, but
whether they convince him that the statute is constitutional or engender in
his mind a rational doubt upon that issue. The oath which he takes as ajudge is not a composite oath, but an individual one. And in passing upon
the validity of a statute, he discharges a duty imposed upon him, which
cannot be consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the views of
others which have neither convinced, nor created a reasonable doubt in, his
mind. If upon a question so important he thus surrender his deliberatejudgment, he stands forsworn. He cannot subordinate his convictions to that
extent and keep faith with his oath or retain his judicial and moral
independence.
Id. at 401-02.
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which the Constitution changes shape to meet the needs of the current
majority:
It is urged that the question involved should now receive fresh
consideration, among other reasons, because of "the economic
conditions which have supervened;" but the meaning of the
Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events. We frequently are told in more general words that the
Constitution must be construed in the light of the present. If by that
it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words that
apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is
quite true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words of the
Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written-
that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would
have applied then -is to rob that instrument of the essential element
which continues it in force as the people have made it until they, and
not their official agents, have made it otherwise.104
Sutherland's dissent raises an important point. If past cases were to
be reversed on the basis of "changed circumstances," and not because
the former opinions were wrong, how was this any different than a
decision to amend the Constitution? How could such a doctrine be
reconciled with the people's right to decide when and how their
constitution should be amended? If authority was placed with the
Court to determine when the Constitution needed updating to meet
modern circumstances, this seems but another version of the Judicial
Supremacy opposed by New Deal appointees like Justice Jackson." 5
On the other hand, if the power to determine changed circumstances
was placed in the legislature, this called into question the enforcement
of any constitutional right against laws reasonably enacted for the
104. Id. at 402-03. Sutherland's Parrish dissent echoes his earlier dissent from
Hughes's opinion in Blaisdell:
What a court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to
the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may
require. The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is
not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon
it.
The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution,
is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its
framers and the people who adopted it....
... A candid consideration of the history and circumstances which led up to
and accompanied the framing and adoption of this clause will demonstrate
conclusively that it was framed and adopted with the specific and studied
purpose of preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors especially in
time of financial distress. Indeed, it is not probable that any other purpose
was definitely in the minds of those who composed the framers' convention
or the ratifying state conventions which followed, although the restriction
has been given a wider application upon principles clearly stated by Chief
Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 452-54 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
105. See Jackson, supra note 11.
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public welfare. Either way, Hughes's vision struck at the very nature
of judicial review and the role of the Court as an independent branch
of government.
C. Textualism
Sutherland's complaint was never directly addressed by the Court
and it is not clear what impact, if any, his arguments had on incoming
members of the New Deal Court.t' Nevertheless, by the next term
(1937-1938), the Court had moved away from Hughes's break with
text and original intent. 7
The first hint came in December of 1937 in Palko v. Connecticut,"
where the Court rejected a claim that liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment included all rights listed in the first eight amendments,
including the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy."'
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo distinguished Lochnerian
liberty of contract from other aspects of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, such as freedom of speech, the press and the free
exercise of religion. He wrote, "[i]n these and other situations
immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force
of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.""'"
106. Justice Van Devanter retired June 2, 1937 and was replaced by Justice Black.
Justice Sutherland retired on January 18, 1938 and was replaced by Justice Reed.
Justice Butler, due to illness, did not participate in any case heard during the 1939
term; he died on November 16, 1939 and was replaced by Justice Murphy. Justice
McReynolds retired February 1, 1941; he was briefly replaced by Justice Byrnes. who
himself was replaced by Justice Rutledge in 1943. See generally Oxford Companion to
Supreme Court, supra note 78.
107. Palko, Carolene Products and Erie all were decided during the same term in
1937-38.
108. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (upholding criminal appeals by the prosecution against
Fourteenth Amendment challenge).
109. Id. at 323. The court indicated:
We have said that in appellant's view the Fourteenth Amendment is to be
taken as embodying the prohibitions of the Fifth. His thesis is even broader.
Whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights if done by the
federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth
Amendment if done by a state. There is no such general rule.
Id.
110. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added). Interestingly, only eleven months earlier in
De Jonge, the Court seemed to imply textual inclusion in the Bill of Rights could be
construed as evidence against inclusion as a due process right. See De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). In DeJonge, the Court wrote:
"The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." The First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment
by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere.
For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil
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Cardozo's link between Fourteenth Amendment liberty and the
"specific pledges of particular amendments" necessarily excludes
Lochnerian liberty of contract. It also excluded non-textual liberties
like the parental rights protected in Pierce. Rather than place Pierce
in the same dustbin as Lochner, however, Cardozo characterized
Pierce as a free exercise case." This despite the fact that the Court in
Pierce never mentioned religious freedom and based its decision
instead on a parent's right to educate their child-a theory broad
enough to protect the rights of a military school.12
The textualist link between Fourteenth Amendment liberty and the
Bill of Rights came up again only a few months later, this time
appearing in a footnote."' In United States v. Carolene Products
Company,'4  the Court declared that henceforth "regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions" is to be
presumed constitutional.' 5 Justice Stone then included a footnote
which explained "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.""' 6 Stone thus echoed
Palko's focus on the "specific pledges of particular amendments.""17
By tying heightened protection of Fourteenth Amendment liberties
to rights expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the
Court distinguished Lochnerian speech, press and religious liberties
and political institutions-principles which the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.
Id. at 364 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,552 (1875)).
111. The Court wrote:
On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
may make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of
speech which the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the
Congress, De Jonge v. Oregon; Herndon v. Lowry; or the like freedom of
the press, Grosjean v. Amerian Press Co.; Near v. Minnesota; or the free
exercise of religion, Hamilton v. Regents; cf. Grosjean v. American Press
Co.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Palko, 302 U.S. at 324. (complete citations omitted).
112. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) ("Under the doctrine
of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." (citation omitted)).
113. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Between Palko in December 1937 and Carolene Products in April 1938, the Court
decided Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). In Lovell, the Court cited Gitlow and
other free speech and free press cases for the proposition that speech and press are
protected aspects of liberty under the Due Process Clause. See id. at 450. Unlike
Gitlow, however, the Court cited neither Lochner nor Allgeyer-the cases once relied
upon by the Court to justify protections of speech and press.
114. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
115. Id. at 152-53.
116. Id. at 152 n.4.
117. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
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from Lochnerian liberty of contract and parental rights. As had
Cardozo in Palko, Stone linked the parental rights cases of Meyer and
Pierce to "specific prohibition[s]" in the Constitution by
characterizing them as involving the rights of religious (Pierce) and
ethnic (Meyer) minorities."
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's prior dissent in which he had
criticized the Court for protecting a right "not specially mentioned in
the text that we have to construe' 1 9 became the intellectual lodestone
for the New Deal rejection of Lochner. As Justice Douglas wrote for
a unanimous Court in Olsen v. Nebraska:'2
In final analysis, the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints
which respondents have suggested for the invalidation of this
legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier
decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long
admonished, should not be read into the Constitution. Since they do
not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give them
continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the
economic and social programs of the states is to be determined.,',
The common law methodology which produced liberty of contract,
the story now went, allowed the Lochner Court to write its personal
predilections into the law.l 2-'  According to Felix Frankfurter, the
words "due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws,"
are so unrestrained, either by their intrinsic meaning, or by their
history, or by tradition, that they leave the individual Justice free, if,
indeed, they do not actually compel him, to fill in the vacuum with
his own controlling conceptions, which are bound to be determined
by his experience, environment, imagination, his hopes and fears-
his "idealized political picture of the existing social order."'2'1
118. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (complete citations omitted). The
Court stated:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce r. Society of Sisters, or
national, Meyer v. Nebraska, Bartels v. Iowa, Farrington v. Tokushige, or
racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, Niron v. Condon; whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (complete citations omitted).
119. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
120. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
121. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added) (referring to Tyson & Brother v. Banton. 273
U.S. 418,446 (1927), and Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570).
122. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
123. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holnes's Constitutional Opinions, in Felix
Frankfurter on the Supreme Court: Extrajudicial Essays on the Court and the
Constitution 117 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Holmes's
Constitutional Opinions]; see also Roosevelt's Address Celebrating the 150th
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The problem with determining the "vague contours" of the Due
Process Clause would play a central role in the debate between
Frankfurter and Jackson regarding the New Deal charter of judicial
review. Although he would part ways with Frankfurter on the
Doctrine of Incorporation, Justice Jackson also believed that textual
expression marked the boundary between judicial deference to the
political branches and judicial enforcement of fundamental liberties.
As he later wrote, "[m]uch of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First [Amendment]
become its standard." 124
Linking heightened judicial protection to textual expression in the
Bill of Rights is a theme that appears throughout individual rights
cases during this period.'2 Unlike cases prior to 1937, where textual
Anniversary of the Philadelphia Convention, in 6 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note
86, at 359, 366 ("Yet nearly every attempt to meet those demands for social and
economic betterment has been jeopardized or actually forbidden by those who have
sought to read into the Constitution language which the framers refused to write into
the Constitution."). Historian Joseph Lash claims that Justice Frankfurter helped
write this speech. See Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the
New Deal 315 (1988).
124. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
125. For examples of such heightened protection, see Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 597 (1942) (Reed, J.) ("[Clareful as we may and should be to protect the
freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to see in such enactments a
shadow of prohibition of the exercise of religion or of abridgement of the freedom of
speech or the press. It is prohibition and unjustifiable abridgement which are
interdicted, not taxation."); id. at 610 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[F]reedom of press and
religion, explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, must at least be entitled to the
same freedom from burdensome taxation which it has been thought that the more
general phraseology of the commerce clause has extended to interstate commerce.");
id. at 624 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[C]ertainly our democratic form of government,
functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibility to accommodate
itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those
views may be. The First Amendment does not put the right freely to exercise religion
in a subordinate position. We fear, however, that the opinions in these and in the
Gobitis case do exactly that."); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)
("[Tihis court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as
fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was
not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise
of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men."); see also
Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943) ("It is a license tax-a flat tax imposed on
the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights.").
The most famous example is from West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where Justice Jackson expressly linked Due Process
rights to the texts of the Bill of Rights:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections....
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness
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expression in the Bill of Rights was irrelevant to the common law
approach to defining "liberty," text now distinguished legitimate from
illegitimate judicial review.
D. Originalism and the Commerce Power
Nowhere was Justice Hughes's "changed circumstances" doctrine
more plausible than in the area of commerce. The fact that the New
Deal Court declined to embrace such a doctrine even here is
additional evidence that the New Deal Revolution, as envisioned by
the Court, was not merely about adjusting the Constitution to meet an
economic emergency. The Revolution involved adjusting the nature
of, and justification for, judicial review.1 26
As was true for the individual rights cases, the New Deal Court
experimented with different justifications for broadening government
power to regulate the economy. Chief Justice Hughes would have
focused on changed economic circumstances.127 Other justices were
not convinced the framers had so restricted government powers to
regulate the economy. Robert Jackson, for example, believed the
Lochner Court had "expanded the concept of 'due process,' and tore
it loose from its ancient connotations; it restricted the concept of the
power to regulate interstate commerce, and cut down the significance
which John Marshall had attributed to it." 1-  It would take several
years for the Court to reach consensus on the principle underlying the
expansion of federal regulatory power.
The New Deal Court's first commerce decisions claimed to follow
the general framework of pre-1937 doctrine. When Chief Justice
Hughes wrote for the majority to uphold the National Labor
Relations Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, his
decision favorably cited the anti-New Deal case Schechter Poutrity. t"
Perhaps because of its narrow holding, Jones & Laughlin did not
of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the
First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a
public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
"rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of
assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect. It is important to
note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon
the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment
that finally govern this case.
Id. at 638-39.
126. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992). For a
critique of Casey's analysis of the New Deal, see Ackerman, Transformations, supra
note 5, at 400.
127. See supra text accompanying note 102.
128. Jackson, supra note 11, at 70.
129. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937).
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trigger the same kind of passionate dissent as had the dramatic
abandonment of liberty of contract in Parrish.3 ' Simply upholding
particular aspects of the New Deal, however, was not enough for New
Deal appointees like Robert Jackson, who believed the problem was a
jurisprudential method which unjustifiably established the Supreme
Court "as a Supreme Censor of legislation."'' Within a few years, the
Court had articulated a broader theory of judicial deference, and
based its new jurisprudence on original intent.
In the 1941 case United States v. Darby,32 a unanimous Court
embraced the "now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes," reversed
Hammer v. Daggenhart, and upheld federal regulation of hours and
wages.133 Abandoning the "changed circumstances" rationale of now-
retired Chief Justice Hughes,"M the Court refused to read the Tenth
Amendment beyond its specific terms and linked the new vision of
commerce power to the intentions of the Founders:
The [Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that
its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. See
e.g., II Elliot's Debates, 123, 131; III id. 450, 464, 600; IV id. 140, 149;
I Annals of Congress, 432, 761,767-768; Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution, §§ 1907-1908.131
Instead of justifying the expansion of government power as a
response to changed circumstances or popular mandate, the Court
insisted it had recovered the originally intended meaning of federal
power:136 "From the beginning and for many years the amendment has
130. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
131. Jackson, supra note 11, at 70.
132. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act's regulation of hours
and wages, with Justice Stone writing for a unanimous Court).
133. Id. at 115. Holmes himself also advocated originalism in interpreting the
Constitution. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 197 (1920) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Sixteenth Amendment should be read in 'a sense most obvious to
the common understanding at the time of its adoption."' (citation omitted)); see also
Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
134. Hughes retired from the Court in 1941, and his vision of the New Deal Charter
retired with him. No New Deal appointee would suggest following his "changed
circumstances" rationale for the New Deal Revolution.
135. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
136. Bruce Ackerman might describe the Court's use of originalism as evidence of
a "partial revolution" or a "revolution on a human scale." See Bruce Ackerman,
Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 Yale L.J. 2279, 2282-83 (1999) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Human Scale]. By this he means that revolutions rarely are promoted as
total breaks with the past (the exceptions being total revolutions like Stalinist Russia).
Id. at 2285-86. Generally, revolutionary leaders do not make a total break from the
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been construed as not depriving the national government of authority
to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee; McCulloch v. Maryland." 31  The next year, in
Wickard v. Filburn, the Court continued the same theme,'1s stating:
"At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. Gibbons v.
Ogden. He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of
this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must
proceed from political rather than from judicial processes." " '
Bruce Ackerman has labeled this attempt to justify the New Deal
expansion of federal power on the intentions of the Founders a "myth
of rediscovery."" It is at least arguable that the New Deal Court
expanded the regulatory power of government beyond that
envisioned at the Founding. My effort, however, is not to determine
the correctness of the New Deal Court's understanding of the
Founding,14 but to understand the Revolution on its own terms. By
past but attempt instead to ground the revolution in the ideals and legal forms of the
past ("revolutions on a human scale"). In this way, Ackerman might try to distinguish
the originalist rhetoric of the New Deal Revolution (the myth) from the substance of
the New Deal (abandonment of liberty of contract).
In the case of the New Deal, however, originalism was not a cover for the New
Deal, it was itself part of the substance of the New Deal. It was essential to the task
of building a new and acceptable method of judicial review after Lochner. To
distinguish this aspect of the revolution would be to leave out what the revolution was
all about-the legitimate exercise of judicial review.
137. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (complete citations omitted).
138. In Wickard, Jackson repeated the analysis he deployed in his book. See
Jackson, supra note 11, at 174 (criticizing the Lochner Court for having abandoned
the original vision of John Marshall).
139. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (complete citations omitted).
140. See Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5, at 62.
141. A number of scholars have argued there are important differences between
the New Deal and federal power as originally intended. See, e.g., Ackerman,
Foundations, supra note 5, at 62 ("The Founders created the least, not the most,
nationalistic regime in our history."); Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the
Fuller Court's Jurisprudence: Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power Over
Commerce and Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Law, 49 Pol. Res.
Q. 415 (1996); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 Yale L.J.
2115, 2117-19 (1999) (discussing and rejecting what he calls the "Restoration Thesis").
The divergence of myth from reality raises important questions, particularly for those
who believe the New Deal Court supervised a moment of legitimate constitutional
revolution. If Professor Ackerman is correct and the New Deal was a legitimate
constitutional moment, then an incorrect understanding of history should not stand in
the way of the people's right to expand the delegated powers of government.
Elsewhere I have argued that an incorrect understanding of the original meaning of
the religion clauses should not undermine the people's right to constitutionalize a
"new understanding or original intent" in 1868. An originalist who accepts the New
Deal as a constitutional moment, but disagrees with the New Deal Court's analysis of
the Founding might acknowledge the New Deal as a constitutional moment, agree
with the New Deal Court that original intent should govern, but argue that what
controls is the original intent of the people at the time of the New Deal. This would
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invoking the original intent of the Commerce Clause, the Court
retained its role as primary enforcer of constitutional norms. 42 This
role was retained at the price of adhering more closely to the text-a
text construed according to its original meaning. Judicial review in a
post-Lochner world no longer would be based on common law norms
of liberty or "implied restrictions," but on clear restrictions in the
constitutional text.
E. The New Deal and the Brooding Omnipresence: Erie
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted its provisions
against an assumed background of pre-existing natural rights. 43 The
Fourteenth Amendment did not create so much as declare national
rights already in existence and deserving the protection of the
courts.'" By the time of the New Deal, however, legal realism had
undermined the idea that courts "discovered" preexisting background
rights.
The same year that Carolene Products distinguished enforceable
textual rights from mere common law liberties, the Court decided Erie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins.145  Just as the Court rejected
common law liberties like liberty of contract, the Court in Erie now
revoked its authority to discover common law rights enforceable
against the states. "[W]hat has been termed the general law of the
country," observed Justice Brandeis, "is often little less than what the
judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general
law on a particular subject.' 1 46 Rejecting such a subjective basis for
judicial review, Brandeis declared "[s]upervision over either the
legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible
constitute the last speaking of the sovereign on the subject of government power, and
it should not be undermined by flawed judicial attempts to ground their decisions in
the views of the Founders.
The one thing an originalist cannot do, however, is to embrace the substance
of the change without the orignalist rationale offered by the New Deal Court.
Originalist methodology was not mere window dressing; it was an indispensable
aspect of the New Deal. Textual originalism is how the Court managed to accomplish
the needed change without damaging the institution of the Court-something no one
wanted or thought necessary.
142. The year after Wickard, the Court reversed Gobitis and handed down its
decisions in Murdock and Barnette, thus ensuring the Court's continued role as
primary guardian of textual liberties. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
143. See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26, at 147; Curtis, No State, supra note 26,
at 41; Lash, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 29, at 1138.
144. See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26, at 147 ("[Elven if the federal Bill of
Rights did not, strictly speaking, bind the states of its own legislative force, was it not
at least declaratory of certain fundamental common-law rights?").
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. Id. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Bough, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
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except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or
delegated to the United States."'47 He continued:
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made
clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the
assumption that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of
any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed
by statute," that federal courts have the power to use their judgment
as to what the rules of common law are; and that in the federal
courts "the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on
matters of general law...."148
Written at the dawn of the New Deal Revolution, Erie signaled that
the Court's new direction went beyond a mere rejection of economic
rights. Soon-to-be Justice Jackson wrote that the Court's decision in
Erie was "[p]erhaps the most remarkable decision of this period and
in some respects one of the most remarkable in the Court's history. "149
In his book, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, Jackson remarked:
147. Id. at 79.
148. Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Brandeis continued:
[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice
adopted by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court) should utter the last word.
Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, "an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States
which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us
hesitate to correct."
Id. (citation omitted).
149. Jackson, supra note 11, at 272. Later in his book, Jackson distinguished the
Lochner Court's enforcement of civil liberties:
There is nothing covert or conflicting in the recent judgments of the Court
on social legislation and on legislative repressions of civil rights. The
presumption of validity which attaches in general to legislative acts is frankly
reversed in the case of interferences with free speech and free assembly, and
for a perfectly cogent reason. Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in
economic wisdom is uncertain can be redressed by the processes of the
ballot box or the pressures of opinion. But when the channels of opinion
and of peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political
correctives can no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is
threatened at its most vital point. In that event the Court, by intervening,
restores the processes of democratic government; it does not disrupt them.
Id. at 284-85. In a footnote, Jackson cited as examples of the Courts enforcement of
speech and assembly, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), Hague v. C.L 0., 307 U.S.
496 (1939), Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and Thornhill 1% Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940). Jackson, supra note 11, at 284 nA8. He then noted "compare,
however, Minersville School District v. Gobitis." Id. This notation is surprising given
that Jackson's "political process" reasoning seemed to track Frankfurter's political
process approach in Gobitis, where the Court's upholding of compelled flag salutes
was based on the contention that the place to dissent from such compulsion was at the
polls. There was no reason to think the channels of democratic reform had been
clogged. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940). In his opinion
in Barnette, which reversed Gobitis, Jackson abandoned the "political process"
reasoning of his earlier book, and instead embraced the textualist justification for
substantive enforcement of the First Amendment. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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The significance of the overruling of [Swift v. Tyson] has probably
not been fully appreciated. It was a change of a legal doctrine, the
very existence of which was but little known outside of the legal
profession. The change was not impelled by "supervening economic
events," nor was it a part of the program of any political party. The
change was made on the initiative of a majority of the Court itself,
without even a demand by a litigant or argument of the point at the
bar. It involved a volunteered confession that the federal judiciary
almost from the foundation of our government has pursued a course
clearly unconstitutional, has all these years been exercising a power
not conferred by the Constitution, and in so doing has invaded rights
reserved by the Constitution to the several states. 50
Erie reflected a startling reversal of the assumptions that had
originally led the Court to embrace free speech, press and religion as
aspects of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 51 Prior to the
New Deal, the Court was authorized to enforce background common
law norms against the conflicting policy choices of state or federal
government. With legal realism having exploded the idea of liberties
existing independent of and superior to the policy choices of
government, judicial intervention was justified only when "specifically
authorized" by constitutional text.
F. Reconstructing the Parental Rights Cases: Meyer and Pierce
The New Deal Court's treatment of Lochnerian parental rights is
additional evidence that the Court was engaged in a broad
restructuring of the nature of judicial review. Had the rejection of
Lochner been based on modern economic theory, or simply on the
need to make way for the New Deal, there would have been little
reason to revisit the parental rights protections of Meyer and Pierce.5 2
On the other hand, if Lochner represented one aspect of a broader,
erroneous theory of judicial review, then the continued viability of
Meyer and Pierce depended on whether they shared-or could be
cleansed of-the errors of Lochner. As then-Professor Frankfurter
wrote not long after Meyer and Pierce were decided:
In rejoicing over [Meyer] and [Pierce], we must not forget that a
heavy price has to be paid for these occasional services to liberalism.
[Lochner], the invalidation of anti-trade union laws, the
150. Jackson, supra note 11, at 272-73 (footnote omitted).
151. Some scholars have argued that Erie mischaracterized the original meaning of
Swift v. Tyson. See, e.g., Ely, Irrepressible Myth, supra note 12; Jack Goldsmith &
Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673 (1998).
Even if this is the case, what the Court was rejecting was the common law
methodology that had come to be associated with Swift.
152. At least not unless those rights directly interfered with the government's new
power to regulate commerce. For an example of where the two conflicted, see infra
notes 170-76 and accompanying text, discussing Prince v. Massachusetts.
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sanctification of the injunction in labor cases, the veto of minimum
wage legislation, are not wiped out by [Pierce].15 3
In fact, the manner in which these cases were handled after 1937
indicates that the New Deal Court saw no difference between judicial
enforcement of parental rights and enforcement of liberty of contract.
Prior to 1937, Meyer and Pierce often were cited in support of the
Court's protection of common law rights like liberty of contract,
parental rights and freedom of speech.' " Beginning in 1937, however,
the Court dropped the reference to non-textual common law liberties
and redefined Meyer and Pierce as cases involving textual First
Amendment rights or ethnic discrimination. In Palko in 1937, Justice
Cardozo characterized Pierce as a free exercise case.' In Footnote
Four of Carolene Products in 1938, Justice Stone described Pierce and
Meyer as involving ethnic and religious discrimination. ' In
Minersville School District v. Gobitis in 1939, Justice Frankfurter
described Pierce as a "Bill of Rights" case."5
Possibly, the Court intended to highlight heretofore "masked" First
Amendment aspects of Meyer and Pierce without intending to call
into question the Lochnerian "parental rights" component. After all,
anti-Catholic animus almost certainly was behind the law passed in
Pierce' and ethnic bias most likely played a role in Meyer."9 If this
were the case, however, we would expect the parental rights aspect to
emerge in appropriate cases. Instead, even when presented a clear
opportunity to speak in favor of parental rights, the Court remained
pointedly silent.
In Gobitis, the Supreme Court denied parents the right to instruct
their children not to salute the flag."'° Writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter cited Pierce as involving the Bill of Rights.b As the sole
dissenter, Justice Stone argued that the law violated freedom of
speech and freedom of religion, rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.162 Stone cited Pierce, not in support of parental autonomy, but
on behalf of the parents' right to seek a religious education for their
153. Felix Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, in
Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 123. at 174, 176.
154. See supra notes 58-60,70 and accompanying text.
155. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,324 (1937).
156. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Stone
made the same characterization of Pierce in his Gobitis dissent. See Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (1940) (Stone. J., dissenting).
157. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599.
158. The compulsory attendance law in Pierce was enacted in the context of a
broad assault on Roman Catholic education. See Lash, Free E-rercise Clause, supra
note 29, at 1149-53.
159. The law was applied to a Lutheran school teaching the German language not
long after World War I.
160. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599-60.
161. Id at 599.
162. Id. at 607.
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children.16 3 Finally, Stone cites both Meyer and Pierce in support of
judicial authority "to scrutinize legislation restricting the civil liberty
of racial and religious minorities although no political process was
affected."'" Stone nowhere mentions the non-textual rights of
parents to control the education of their children. Instead, his dissent
is based solely on liberties expressed in text of the Bill of Rights and
equal protection doctrine.'65
A few years later, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 16
reversed Gobitis and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witness children to
refuse to salute the flag. Despite the obvious relationship to cases
involving the parental right to direct the education of their children,
Justice Jackson's endorsement of individual rights never mentioned,
much less cited, Meyer and Pierce.67 Instead, he justified heightened
review because the case involved the specific prohibitions of the First
Amendment, not merely a vague due process liberty.168
Perhaps the "loudest" silence'69 regarding parental rights occurred
in the 1944 case, Prince v. Massachusetts.7 ' In Prince, the majority
upheld the application of a state child labor law against a Jehovah's
Witness parent who wished to have her child assist her in selling
religious literature.' 7' The mother argued that the law violated her
free exercise rights, as well as her parental rights protected under
Meyer.17 In response, the majority implied in a footnote that the
163. Id. at 603.
164. Id. at 606.
165. Id. at 606-07. Justice Stone wrote:
For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the
religious freedom of small minorities, which is admittedly within the scope of
the protection of the Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same
judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe the
constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities.
Id. at 607.
166. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
167. In fact, only Frankfurter in dissent mentioned these cases. He cited Pierce for
the proposition that the students were not forced to go to public schools; and he used
the case as part of a slippery slope argument. See id. at 656, 661 ("And what of the
larger issue of claiming immunity from obedience to a general civil regulation that has
a reasonable relation to a public purpose within the general competence of the state?"
(citation omitted)). Justice Jackson also pointedly ignored Meyer and Pierce in his
book The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 71.
168. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
169. There are other less dramatic silences as well. For example, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts cited Schneider, a post-New
Deal free speech case, in support of his contention that all of the First Amendment is
protected under the Due Process Clause. The pre-New Deal cases of Meyer and
Pierce are not mentioned, despite Justice Cardozo's characterization in Palko (three
years earlier) that these cases represented the Court's protection of religious liberty.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
170. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
171. Id. at 170.
172. Id. at 164.
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parental rights claim added nothing to the religious freedom claim."
Next the Court conceded that Meyer and Pierce protected a form of
family autonomy, but one that deserved no more than rational basis
review 74-no more protection than would be afforded a liberty of
contract claim.175  The dissenting opinions in Prince, both of which
argued that the mother's religious freedom claim should be sustained,
never cited Pierce and Meyer, much less invoked parental rights.
Instead, Justice Murphy in his dissent obliterated Lochnerian parental
rights by conceding that "the family itself is subject to reasonable
regulation in the public interest."17 6 The "silences" of Prince are but
one example of how New Deal justices, when faced with the strongest
incentive to breath life into Lochnerian parental rights, declined to so.
Years later, long after the New Deal, the parental rights aspect of
Meyer and Pierce would be revived. At first, justices would
acknowledge these cases no longer stood for parental autonomy.'"
173. Id at 164 n.8 ("The due process claim, as made and perhaps necessarily,
extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the circumstances all that
is comprehended in the former is included in the latter.").
174. Id at 166-67 (citing the state's power to enact child labor laws and concluding:
"It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting
the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and
religious conviction.").
175. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938).
176. Prince, 321 U.S. at 173 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Murphy continued:
We are concerned solely with the reasonableness of this particular
prohibition of religious activity by children.
In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly or indirectly infringe
religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their children in the
practice of a religious belief, we are not aided by any strong presumption of
the constitutionality of such legislation. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 note 4. On the contrary, the human freedoms
enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to
sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid.
Id.
177. In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan cites Pierce and Meyer-as well
as Allgeyer (!) for the proposition that liberty means more than the rights listed in the
text (he skips Lochner). Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543-44 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Harlan concedes that this is not the post-New Deal understanding of
Pierce:
I consider this so, even though today those decisions would probably have
gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience
assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, concepts that
are derived from the explicit guarantees of the First Amendment against
federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief. See West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette; Prince v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. For it is the purposes of those guarantees and not their text,
the reasons for their statement by the Framers and not the statement itself,
see Palko v. Connecticut: United States v. Carolene Products Co., which
have led to their present status in the compendious notion of "liberty"
embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a
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Later, the cases were cited as if the New Deal retooling had never
occurred. 178 Today, it is not unusual to see Meyer and Pierce cited as
evidence that the New Deal Court did not intend to abandon non-
textual substantive due process altogether. 79 The opinions of the New
Deal Court, however, indicate otherwise: future enforcement of
fundamental rights would be limited to those expressly mentioned in
the Bill of Rights. In this way, the vague contours of the Due Process
Clause no longer would be used to enforce the subjective opinions of
the Court, nor would judicial identification of common law rights
cloak mere judicial preferences. To the extent that prior cases
indicated otherwise, they must either be rejected (liberty of contract)
or reformulated (parental rights) to fit the New Deal Court's embrace
of textualism and the limits of legitimate judicial review.
III. INCORPORATION AND THE NEW DEAL DEBATES
Focusing on text for determining due process liberties accomplished
a number of important goals. It explained the rejection of Lochner
and the expansion of federal power without breaking faith with
constitutional text (the Constitution, the New Dealers insisted, was
not the problem) and without undermining the role of the Court as an
independent branch of government (nor was the problem the Court as
an institution).'
background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally
perceived and historically developed.
Id. at 544 (complete citations omitted).
178. Pierce and Meyer appear again in 1965-in Justice Douglas's opinion in
Griswold-only now they were described in Lochnerian terms as protecting the non-
textual right of parents to control the education of their children. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). Douglas, for example, cited the two cases as
protecting non-textual, "penumbral" rights. See id. at 484. He wrote:
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-whether
public or private or parochial-is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to
study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First
Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights.
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters... the right to educate one's children as one
chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. Nebraska... the same dignity is
given the right to study the German language in a private school.
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). Justice Goldberg cited Meyer as representing rights
beyond the first eight amendments protected under the Ninth Amendment, in this
case rights of marital and family privacy. Id. at 488. Justice White noted that these
rights were protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 502.
179. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1318 (2d ed. 1988).
180. The pervasive view that the Court as an institution was not the problem can be
seen by the negative response to Roosevelt's "Horse and Buggy" speech, which was
delivered in the aftermath of the Schechter Poultry decision, and the criticism of his
proposal to pack the Court. See Leuchtenburg, Supreme Court Reborn, supra note 6,
at 157-61 (describing the impact of the court packing plan); William E. Leuchtenburg,
When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman
Thesis, 108 Yale L.J. 2077, 2081 (1999) (discussing the response to the "Horse and
Buggy" speech).
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Simply hewing more closely to the text, however, created a host of
difficult interpretive issues. If text is what distinguishes Lochner from
freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights, then what principled interpretive
theory prevented total incorporation of the Bill of Rights?""' Not only
was a sudden expansion of judicial authority over textual rights
politically unthinkable at the time, there were those on the Court who
believed protection of all textual rights should be scaled back to
reflect a more realist interpretation of the Court's role in a
constitutional democracy. Consensus on one issue, textual
originalism, triggered a prolonged debate regarding the future of
incorporated rights.
A. The Political Process Model
Although sharply critical of the Lochner Court, Justice Jackson
conceded that the pre-1937 Court had "rendered civil liberties
decisions of substantial value" by protecting "pretty consistently the
writ of habeas corpus (Ex parte Milligan), fair trial (Powell v.
Alabama), the franchise (Nixon v. Herdon), freedom of the press
(Near v. Minnesota), and free speech (Fiske v. Kansas)." According
to Jackson, these rights were essential to the proper functioning of the
democratic process:
There is nothing covert or conflicting in the recent judgments of the
Court on social legislation and on legislative repressions of civil
rights. The presumption of validity which attaches in general to
legislative acts is frankly reversed in the case of interferences with
free speech and free assembly, and for a perfectly cogent reason.
Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in economic wisdom is uncertain
can be redressed by the processes of the ballot box or the pressures
of opinion. But when the channels of opinion and of peaceful
persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political correctives can
no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at
its most vital point. In that event the Court, by intervening, restores
the processes of democratic government; it does not disrupt them.'o
Jackson's approach mirrored that of Carolene Products Footnote
Four, which listed interference with freedoms of speech, press and
assembly as restrictions on political processes which call for
heightened review." Footnote Four also suggested "similar
considerations" may call for heightened review of "statutes directed
181. At least, what theory prevented total incorporation of the rst eight
amendments?
182. Jackson, supra note 11, at 71. accord Fr pane Milligan. 71 U.S. 2 (1866);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
183. Jackson, supra note 11, at 284-85; see also Ely, supra note 26, at 73-134.
184. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities."'85 According
to Justice Stone, "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." '186
The focus of the political process model was discrimination. 187
Heightened judicial scrutiny was reserved for those situations where
political views or religious beliefs were denied equal access to the
public marketplace or somehow reflected a failure in the ordinary
process of political representation. 18  This equal protection approach
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. It is during this same period that discrimination against out-of-state commerce
emerges as a key factor in dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. See S.C. State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938).
188. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (strikinL,
down, on equal protection grounds, a sterilization statute). Skinner represented how
firmly a majority of the Court was opposed to recognizing non-textual due process
rights. Given the context in which the decision was announced-the United States
was at war with Nazi Germany-there could not have been a more tempting moment
to announce that liberty included freedom from coerced eugenic experiments.
Instead, the Court ignored the plaintiffs due process claims and, on its own initiative,
based its decision on equal protection. See id. at 538. Indeed, Justice Douglas, for the
majority, and Justice Stone, in his concurrence, presumed the constitutionality of
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927), which recognized the constitutionality of
sterilizing feeble-minded individuals.
Justice Stone's concurrence in Skinner argued the case should have been
decided on the basis of procedural due process, the plaintiff not having been provided
a hearing. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544. He wrote:
There are limits to the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality
can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is concerned (see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4) and where
the presumption is resorted to only to dispense with a procedure which the
ordinary dictates of prudence would seem to demand for the protection of
the individual from arbitrary action.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson agreed with the majority and Justice Stone
that both equal protection and procedural due process had been violated. Jackson
concurred, however, in order to express his view that even if the proper procedure
had been provided, "[t]here are limits to the extent to which a legislatively
represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the
dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority." Id. at 546. His concurrence
foreshadowed his defense of individual liberty against the tyranny of the majority in
Barnette but did not follow the textual limitations he traced in Barnette. See infra text
accompanying note 211. Jackson's concurrence stood as a kind of halfway point
between his embrace of political process in his book, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, and his ultimate adoption of the textual Preferred Freedoms model in
Murdock and Barnette.
Finally, Skinner reflected the options available to the Court under the Equal
Protection Clause, even as due process was limited to textual rights. Equal protection
also had to be reformulated during the New Deal; aspects of Lochner, after all, were
based on equal protection considerations as well as substantive due process. Both
Justice Stone's Footnote Four, and Justice Frankfurter's political process model
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was more deferential to the political process than the substantive
protection of rights under Lochner. Laws generally affecting
everyone's speech or activities were not suspect as long as "channels
of opinion and of peaceful persuasion" remained open. t"
The political process model provided a principled explanation for
the Court's rejection of both Lochner and total incorporation.
Lochner lacked the textual pedigree necessary to restrict the
subjective preferences of the Court. Not all texts in the Bill, however,
were essential to the proper functioning of the political process.
Consider the Court's justification for protecting freedom of speech
and press in the 1939 case Schneider v. State:
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the
press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not
an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the
framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the
foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many
opinions of this court, the importance of preventing the restriction
of enjoyment of these liberties.
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the
rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect
of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
191
Understanding speech and religion as political process rights helps
to explain how the Court could hand down its 1939 decision in
Gobitis, only one month after protecting the free exercise rights of
Jehovah's Witnesses in Cantvell v. Connecticut. In Gobitis, the
suggested limiting equal protection to classifications which threaten the proper
functioning of the political process. This would allow the Court to continue enforcing
non-textual freedoms like the right to vote under the rubric of equal protection. Just
as a majority of the Court moved away from the political process limitation for due
process, Skinner may indicate a similar move was occurring under equal protection
doctrine. However, coming as it did in the midst of a war against Nazi Germany, and
given the flux of judicial thinking during this period, it is hard to see Skinner as
representing a stable consensus regarding the post-Lociner theory of equal
protection.
189. Jackson, supra note 11, at 284-85.
190. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
191. Id. at 161. In another 1939 case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939),
the Supreme Court ruled that determining the validity of a proposed constitutional
amendment was a "political question," resolvable by the political branches, and not
the Court.
192. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In Cannvell, Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous
court, "[tihe fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth]
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id. at 303.
Interestingly, he cited Schneider, a 1939 case, as support and made no mention of the
many pre-1937 cases which upheld the right to free speech and press. See id. In
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Court had to decide whether local public school boards could require
objecting children to salute the flag.193  In an 8-1 decision, Justice
Frankfurter rejected the claim that a coerced salute violated either
freedom of speech or religious exercise. Absent a showing of
intentional discrimination, Frankfurter ruled, the Court must defer to
the greater competency of states and local school boards to determine
what was necessary to advance the legitimate interest in national
unity.14 As much as Gobitis today might be considered to be a low
point in judicial protection of individual rights, 19 5 at the time it was
perfectly in keeping with one approach to the New Deal Revolution.
If Lochner was rejected due to the need to defer to the policy making
decisions of the political branches, then judicial interference is
justified only to the extent necessary to keep open the channels of
political reform.'96 Under this approach, laws which discriminated
against religious or ethnic minorities tended to prevent the otherwise
equal participation envisioned by the political process model. Absent
intentional discrimination, however, the Court had no legitimate
excuse to interfere.9 7 According to Frankfurter, "[e]xcept where the
transgression of constitutional liberty is too plain for argument,
Cantwell, the Court ruled that a city had imposed a prior restraint on Jehovah's
Witnesses' ability to disseminate their religious views. See id. The channels of
persuasion having been closed, the case came within the reach of the political process
model.
193. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
194. Id. at 595.
195. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990) (citing Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
196. In the 1925 case, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include the right of free speech but
deferred to the political process and legislative determinations regarding the danger
of certain forms of speech. The Court wrote:
By enacting the present statute the State has determined, through its
legislative body, that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized
government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the
general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be
penalized in the exercise of its police power. That determination must be
given great weight.... We cannot hold that the present statute is an
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State ....
Id. at 668-70. Both Gitlow in 1925 and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, in 1927
were decided under the same "reasonableness" standard as liberty of contract. Thus,
the political process model may have been closer to pre-1937 First Amendment
jurisprudence than the substantive protection ultimately adopted in Barnette.
197. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594 ("The religious liberty which the Constitution protects
has never excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties
of particular sects."). In dissent, Stone argued there was reason to suspect
discrimination:
For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the
religious freedom of small minorities, which is admittedly within the scope of
the protection of the Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same
judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe the
constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities.
Id. at 607.
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personal freedom is best maintained-so long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed."'"
Frankfurter's argument tracked his rejection of Lochner and his
belief that unduly vague constitutional provisions like "due process"
and "liberty" could be filled with the personal policy choices of the
justices.19
When we come to the broad, undefined clauses of the Constitution
we are in a decisively different realm of judicial action [than
determining the meaning of "search and seizure"]. The scope of
application is relatively unrestricted, and the room for play of
individual judgment as to policy correspondingly wide. A few
simple terms like "liberty" and "property," phrases like "regulate
Commerce... among the several States" and "without due process
of law" call for endless "interpretation." ... The words of ["due
process of law" and "equal protection of the laws"] are so
unrestrained, either by their intrinsic meaning, or by their history, or
by tradition, that they leave the individual Justice free, if, indeed,
they do not actually compel him, to fill in the vacuum with his own
controlling conceptions, which are bound to be determined by his
experience, environment, imagination, his hopes and fears-his
"idealized political picture of the existing social order." Should such
power, affecting the intimate life of nation and States, be entrusted,
ultimately, to five men?20°
Meeting Frankfurter's objection would result in the first clearly
articulated doctrine of incorporation: the Preferred Freedoms
Doctrine.
198. Id at 599. Frankfurter developed this point further in his Barnette dissent:
When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this Court, wrote that -it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts,"... he went to
the very essence of our constitutional system and the democratic conception
of our society. He did not mean that for only some phases of civil
government this Court was not to supplant legislatures and sit in judgment
upon the right or wrong of a challenged measure. He was stating the
comprehensive judicial duty and role of this Court in our constitutional
scheme whenever legislation is sought to be nullified on any ground, namely,
that responsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they are
directly to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to
determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures
they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable justification can be
offered.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
199. Frankfurter is generally associated with the Legal Process school of H.LA.
Hart and Alexander Bickel. See Kalman, Law, Politics, supra note 100, at 2208.
200. Frankfurter, Holmes's Constitutional Opinions, supra note 123. at 116-18
(quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harv. L Rev. 641, 651
(1923)).
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B. Preferred Freedoms Doctrine
In the period between Frankfurter's 1939 opinion in Gobitis and its
reversal in Barnette in 1943, the Court expressly embraced textual
originalism under the Commerce Clause. That move would have
implications for other areas of law. Although the Tenth Amendment
did not expressly limit government regulation of commerce, the First
Amendment was a clear restriction on government activity. Even if
heightened review was not warranted by the former, it certainly was
by the latter. Moreover, where original intent was irrelevant to a
common law interpretation of freedom of speech and press, the
original meaning of a specific text attained a new importance.20 1 It
was here that the political process model came into conflict with the
interpretive moves the Court was making under the Commerce
Clause, federal common law and incorporation. It is not surprising
that soon after adopting textual originalism the Court revisited, and
abandoned, the political process model of Justice Frankfurter when it
came to the incorporated text of the First Amendment.
Justice Stone was the sole dissenter in Gobitis. In the First
Amendment cases which followed, he continued his opposition to the
mere relative protections of the political process model. Dissenting to
the Court's decision to uphold a flat tax applied against the door-to-
door sale of religious literature, Stone declared:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to
wipe them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the
First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a
preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases
where the protected privilege is sought out for attack.2' z
This is the first appearance of the Preferred Freedoms Doctrine.
By focusing on First Amendment freedoms, Stone placed an
interpretive wedge between liberty of contract and the First
Amendment (one textual, one not), and between the First
Amendment and total incorporation (only some textual freedoms are
"preferred"). Thus, like the political process model, this approach
limits heightened judicial protection to certain critical rights listed in
the First Amendment. Unlike the political process model, however,
the Preferred Freedoms Doctrine extended to all First Amendment
freedoms-including religious liberty-and called for substantive, not
merely relative, protection.
Under the Preferred Freedoms model, equal treatment was not
enough. According to Justice Black, "our democratic form of
government, functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high
201. Some scholars have argued that interpretation of a text necessarily leads to
some form of originalism. See, e.g., Barnett, Originalism, supra note 21.
202. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of
minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those views may
be."203 Joined by Justices Murphy and Douglas, Black wrote "[s]ince
we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an
appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it also was
wrongly decided.... The First Amendment does not put the right
freely to exercise religion in a subordinate position."2
Only one year after Jones v. Opelika upheld a flat tax on the sale of
religious literature, the Court reversed course and struck down the
same kind of tax in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.25 As Justice Douglas
explained:
A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right
granted by the Federal Constitution.... The fact that the ordinance
is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the
First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges
protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.
Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position.206
After Murdock, the days of Gobitis clearly were numbered. Only one
month later, on the fourteenth of June, Flag Day, Justice Jackson
abandoned his earlier embrace of political process and authored the
opinion reversing Gobitis. Justice Frankfurter's draft of the New Deal
charter for judicial review had been rejected. Jackson's opinion in
Barnette' dramatically highlighted the debate between Frankfurter
and the advocates of the Preferred Freedoms Doctrine. Although
recognized today as a great moment in constitutional liberty, at the
time it was written, Barnette raised as many questions as it answered.
Even if the Court was right to reject the political process model,
Jackson failed to adequately explain the basis for its selective
enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
203. Id. at 624.
204. Id at 623-24.
205. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
206. Id. at 113-15 (emphasis added).
207. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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C. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 0 s
In 1941, Jackson had embraced the political process model of First
Amendment freedoms,2°9 as had seven other members of the Court.
By 1943, however, only Justice Roberts remained from the pre-New
Deal Court and the country was embroiled in war. It was in this
context-under circumstances generally calling for the greatest degree
of deference to political necessities -that the Court reversed Gobitis
and upheld the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to salute the
flag. The fact that Barnette was handed down on Flag Day makes the
case tantamount to a Declaration of Independence-the
independence of the Court.
Barnette cannot be understood apart from the context of the
Court's struggle to define judicial review in a New Deal world.
Jackson's opinion is suffused with references to the recent upheaval in
jurisprudence, the abandonment of laissez-faire economic doctrine,
and the tremendously difficult task of reconstructing judicial review
after Lochner:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with
the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a
philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his
208. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Professor Bruce Ackerman has suggested that the New
Deal expansion of government power into previously "private areas" like property
and contract autonomy justified not only textual incorporation, but also judicial
protection of non-textual rights like privacy. See Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction,
supra note 43; Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713
(1985) [hereinafter Ackerman, Carolene Products]. Some aspects of Jackson's
opinion can be read this way, particularly where he noted the need to "transplant
these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference
has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly
sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened
governmental controls." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640. Jackson had also previously
signaled his willingness to enforce non-textual rights in his Skinner concurrence. See
supra note 188 (discussing the significance of Skinner).
Other aspects of Jackson's opinion, however, cannot be read so expansively.
Jackson insisted that the problems associated with the vague contours of the Due
Process Clause disappear when limited to the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
This would have been disingenuous in the extreme if Jackson believed legitimatejudicial review included no such limitation. In the end, Jackson's opinion in Barnette
was only one of many in which the Court identified textualism as the fundamental
core of legitimate due process review. Any reading of the New Deal which leaves the
door open to non-textual substantive due process rights must somehow explain the
Court's recharacterization of Meyer and Pierce as Bill of Rights cases, the refusal to
adopt total incorporation, and the abandonment of federal common law in Erie.
Above all, such an approach conflicts with the Court's consistent embrace of
textualism as the fundamental core of due process rights.
209. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 284-85.
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liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental
restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few
controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs. We
must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire
concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to
economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought
through closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls. These changed conditions
often deprive precedents of reliability and cast us more than we
would choose upon our own judgment. But we act in these matters
not by authority of our competence but by force of our
commissions.210
In this one remarkable passage, Jackson acknowledged the
constitutional upheaval of the New Deal-the changed conditions that
deprived precedents of reliability and the difficulty of trying to
translate the Bill of Rights into a post-New Deal world. There were
no precedents to rely upon, no consensus regarding methods of
interpretation. Having received a commission to reconstruct judicial
review without the benefit of a textual amendment, the Court had
indeed been cast upon its own judgment in a manner that disturbed
self-confidence.
The most pressing problem involved how to define the method and
scope of post-Lochner judicial review. Speech, press and religious
liberty had all been protected under Lochner. If the majority
proceeded to reject Frankfurter's draft of the New Deal charter and
preserve judicial protection of the Bill of Rights, how could the Court
enforce rights originally "discovered" by the Lochner Court without
repeating the errors of Lochner? Jackson's first move was to return to
the Palko-Carolene Products emphasis on text:
In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment
and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of
legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because
it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the
vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific
prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to
regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the
due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may
not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the state may lawfully protect. It is important to note that
while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the
210. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639-40.
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State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First
Amendment that finally govern this case.
The political process model also had focused on the "specific
limiting principles of the First Amendment."2"2 Jackson had to justify
removing these subjects from the non-discriminatory control of the
political branches. In one of the most famous passages in
constitutional law, Jackson rejected Frankfurter's deference to the
political process and traced a textual originalist theory of post-
Lochner judicial review:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.213
As stirring as this passage seems to us today, at the time it was
written it was no more than a bald assertion, and a historically
incorrect one to boot. Whatever was the original purpose of the
original Bill of Rights, it was not intended to place particular rights
beyond the reach of state majorities. 214  The Bill bound only the
federal government and reserved power over subjects like speech and
religion to the states.215 Moreover, if inclusion in the Bill of Rights
signaled an intent to remove a subject from the political process, this
implied that all of the rights in the Bill were intended to be protected
from state political majorities-a move Jackson knew full well the
Court was unwilling to make. Even if Frankfurter's political process
model had been rejected, the substantive protections of Barnette and
the Preferred Freedoms model raised extremely difficult questions-
questions that would have to be answered in future cases involving
enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states.
D. Frankfurter's Challenge: The Problem With Selective
Incorporation
The debate over the political process and Preferred Freedoms
models should not obscure the broad consensus among the members
of the New Deal Court regarding the core principles of post-Lochner
review. After 1937, judicial interference with the political process was
211. Id. at 639-40.
212. Id. at 639.
213. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
214. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 242, 243 (1833).
215. For general discussions regarding the federalist nature of the original Bill of
Rights, see Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26; Steven D. Smith, Foreordained
Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (1995); Lash,
Power and Religion, supra note 29.
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justified solely on the basis of constitutional text. The embrace of text
went hand and hand with the Court's rejection of common law
methodology as a basis for interfering with state or federal law and
the embrace of originalism as the measure of the commerce power.
The Court's next task was to identify the interpretive theory which
would replace the common law approach of the Lochner Court.
Simply invoking "textualism" was problematic; it left unexplained why
inclusion in the texts of the Bill of Rights did not automatically lead to
total incorporation.216 The selective approach of Twining, originally
deployed to distinguish the Court's common law methodology from
textual incorporation, now was deployed by the New Deal Court in
order to justify selective incorporation of only some text in the Bill of
Rights. Although combining Twining with the Preferred Freedoms
Doctrine explained the rejection of Lochner while avoiding the
firestorm which would accompany total incorporation, this approach
threatened to repeat the same errors of Lochner. Justice Frankfurter
in particular accused the majority of having returned to the evil days
of Lochner
In the past this Court has from time to time set its views of policy
against that embodied in legislation by finding laws in conflict with
what was called the "spirit of the Constitution." Such undefined
destructive power was not conferred on this Court by the
Constitution. Before a duly enacted law can be judicially nullified, it
must be forbidden by some explicit restriction upon political
authority in the Constitution. Equally inadmissible is the claim to
strike down legislation because to us as individuals it seems opposed
to the "plan and purpose" of the Constitution. That is too tempting
a basis for finding in one's personal views the purposes of the
Founders.
217
Frankfurter believed that the problem with Lochner was the
general counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review. Except for
clearly unreasonable actions by the legislature, the proper role of the
Court was limited to policing the political process.'21 Not only had
Lochner interfered with reasonable social welfare legislation, it had
compounded its error by constitutionalizing the subjective policy
choices of the Court. To Frankfurter, the Preferred Freedoms model
repeated both errors: it resulted in judicial invalidation of otherwise
reasonable legislation, and it did so by way of subjective judicial
selection of some liberties listed in the Bill of Rights."
216. Sudden total incorporation in the midst of Roosevelt's battles with the Court
might well have been viewed as tantamount to institutional suicide.
217. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 666 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., id at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
219. According to Frankfurter's concurrence in Adamson:
Indeed, the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
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Frankfurter had a point. 20 At the time Barnette was decided, the
Court's entire liberty jurisprudence, including its protection of speech,
press and religion, rested on the same Lochnerian foundation. If the
Court had rejected the foundation upon which stood Gitlow and Near,
on what basis could those cases continue to stand? Indeed, how could
the process of incorporation legitimately continue? Neither Carolene
Products nor Barnette provided a principled solution to the riddle of
incorporation. As much as those cases highlighted the importance of
text, the Court could not logically claim that textual expression
justifies heightened enforcement as long as it continued to reject total
incorporation. Picking and choosing among rights to be incorporated
first eight Amendments as such is not unambiguously urged. Even the
boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting to more than half the States
that they may no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grand
jury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must furnish a jury of
twelve for every case involving a claim above twenty dollars.... It seems
pretty late in the day to suggest that a phrase so laden with historic meaning
should be given an improvised content consisting of some but not all of the
provisions of the first eight Amendments, selected on an undefined basis,
with improvisation of content for the provisions so selected.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64-65, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
220. Justice Frankfurter further stated in Barnette:
There is no warrant in the constitutional basis of this Court's authority for
attributing different roles to it depending upon the nature of the challenge to
the legislation. Our power does not vary according to the particular
provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked. The right not to have
property taken without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial
power is concerned, the same constitutional dignity as the right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the latter has no
less claim than freedom of the press or freedom of speech or religious
freedom. In no instance is this Court the primary protector of the particular
liberty that is invoked. This Court has recognized, what hardly could be
denied, that all the provisions of the first ten Amendments are "specific"
prohibitions, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4.
But each specific Amendment, in so far as embraced within the Fourteenth
Amendment, must be equally respected, and the function of this Court does
not differ in passing on the constitutionality of legislation challenged under
different Amendments.
When Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for this Court, wrote that "it must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts," Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, he went to the very essence of our
constitutional system and the democratic conception of our society. He did
not mean that for only some phases of civil government this Court was not
to supplant legislatures and sit in judgment upon the right or wrong of a
challenged measure. He was stating the comprehensive judicial duty and
role of this Court in our constitutional scheme whenever legislation is sought
to be nullified on any ground, namely, that responsibility for legislation lies
with legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the people, and this
Court's only and very narrow function is to determine whether within the
broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have exercised a
judgment for which reasonable justification can be offered.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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seemed to repeat the very subjectivity that stained the Lochner Court.
Again, according to Frankfurter:
There is suggested merely a selective incorporation of the first eight
Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment. Some are in and
some are out, but we are left in the dark as to which are in and
which are out. Nor are we given the calculus for determining which
go in and which stay out. If the basis of selection is merely that those
provisions of the first eight Amendments are incorporated which
commend themselves to individual justices as indispensable to the
dignity and happiness of a free man, we are thrown back to a merely
subjective test.22
The advocates of the Preferred Freedoms model invoked the
Court's reasoning in Twining in order to justify its refusal to
automatically incorporate all the freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights.
But neither the Twining rule of selective enforcement nor the doctrine
of Preferred Freedoms fit comfortably with the Court's move to
textualism under the Due Process Clause. The Twining rule originally
was a rule for protecting common law liberties in general and liberty
of contract in particular. In retrospect, at least Twining had the virtue
of plausibly tracking the original intent behind the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.' Selective "text-only" incorporation, however,
lacked either textual or historical warrant. '  In Barnette, the Court
had committed itself to textual incorporation without a coherent
theory of why selective textual incorporation was consistent with the
new jurisprudence of the New Deal Court.
E. Justice Black's Response: Fourteenth Amendment Textual
Originalism
Roosevelt's first judicial appointment, Justice Hugo Black, replaced
retiring Justice Van Devanter in 1937. One of his first decisions was
to concur in Carolene Products, but not join the section containing
Footnote Four. 4 Black joined Frankfurter in Gobitis but soon came
to believe he had made a mistake.' Along with a majority of the
Court, Black joined Jackson's rejection of the political process model
in Barnette, and ultimately staked out his own unique vision of post-
Lochner incorporated rights.26
221. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
222. See supra notes 26,62-65 and accompanying text.
223. The Preferred Freedoms Doctrine, for example, provided neither a textual nor
a historical reason for "preferring" the right to counsel over the right against double
jeopardy.
224. I am not aware of any explanation for Black's decision not to join Footnote
Four.
225. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ.,
dissenting).
226. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
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An advocate of total incorporation, Black believed that proceeding
under the selective incorporation theory of Twining was in conflict
with the original intent behind the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Black wrote that his "study of the historical events that
culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment" convinced him that "one
of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first
section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was
to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states. '2 7 In this way
"[Twining] and the 'natural law' theory of the Constitution upon
which it relies degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of
Rights." 28 According to Black, "[t]his historical purpose has never
received full consideration or exposition in any opinion of this Court
interpreting the Amendment.""n9
Black had an additional problem with the Twining/Preferred
Freedoms Doctrine. By empowering the Court to select which
provisions in the Bill of Rights were "fundamental," the Twining rule
repeated, and indeed became an essential aspect of, the Lochner
approach to due process. The natural law approach of Twining was
"an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution. ' '711 Such an
approach was "itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly
convey[ed] to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power
over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the
Constitution limits legislative power. '' "l Expressly invoking the New
Deal Revolution, Black maintained that "the Twining decision rested
on previous cases and broad hypotheses which have been undercut by
intervening decisions of this Court. ' ' 2
If the New Deal was in fact a constitutional revolution, Black's
jurisprudence came closest to reconciling this revolution with the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, if the protections of the Due
Process Clause turned on judicial discovery of "fundamentality," then
Footnote Four's embrace of the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights was no more legitimate than the Court's embrace of liberty of
contract. Black avoided this objection, however, by grounding
incorporation not on subjective choices of the Court, but on the
intentions of those who drafted and adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment.233
An originalist account of the Fourteenth Amendment almost
certainly would include common law liberties like free labor and
227. Id. at 71-72.
228. Id. at 70.
229. Id. at 72.
230. Id. at 75.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 70.
233. See id. at 92-123 (app. by Black, J.).
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liberty of contract.2-' In the aftermath of the New Deal Revolution,
however, the Court no longer was authorized to discover and enforce
rights arising from the mists of the common law."  Yet by embracing
(if recharacterizing) Twining, and rejecting the text as the final source
of what constituted the "body of law," the Court was left in the
position of determining the substantive content of liberty.' Black
thus noted that "the Twining decision rested on previous cases and
broad hypotheses which have been undercut by intervening decisions
of this Court." 7 The New Deal Revolution acted as a constitutional
screen, preserving those privileges or immunities expressly mentioned
in the text, but screening out those discoverable only by way of
common law.
Justice Black did not prevail. Over the years, Justice Black's
position has been criticized as a flawed reading of Fourteenth
Amendment history,' an unjustifiable insistence on incorporating all
eight amendments,n39  and an erroneous rejection of judicial
234. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
235. A related issue is the extent to which the Court could accomplish by way of
the Equal Protection Clause what had been rejected under the Due Process Clause.
Some scholars have argued that non-textual "privileges or immunities" may have
been intended to receive some degree of equal protection. See, e.g.. Amar, Bill of
Rights, supra note 26, at 171-74; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1387-88, 1392, 1396 (1992). Lochnerian liberty
of contract itself contained an equal protection component. In fact, most due process
rights can be described in equal protection terms. Non-textual liberties that could be
described as involving equal protection concerns include abortion, assisted suicide,
sexual orientation and disability. See, eg., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (state
constitutional amendment banning homosexual anti-discrimination laws violates the
equal protection clause); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality
arguing that access to abortion facilitates women's equal participation in the
marketplace); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking
down ordinance requiring special use permit as applied against a home for the
mentally retarded); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793
(1997) (circuit court striking down ban on assisted suicide as violation of equal
protection). The laws struck down in Romer and Cleburne failed to satisfy the lowest
level of judicial scrutiny, "rational basis review." The rejection of Lochner would
have included a rejection of this aspect of equal protection-thus the Court's
suggestion in Carolene Products that equal protection would focus on political process
considerations and protection of "discreet and insular minorities." See United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also supra note 188
(discussing Skinner v. Oklahoma).
236. Justice Black's critique of Twining as opening the door to Lochner II was
prophetic.
237. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
238. See Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 28, at 171.
239. See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26, at 174-75; see also Adamson, 332 U.S.
at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Bruce Ackerman also would not limit
incorporation to the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, arguing that such narrow
adherence to the text would be hyper-formalistic and would introduce a kind of
mechanical jurisprudence generally derided by the legal academy. See Ackerman,
Carolene Products, supra note 208, at 744. The point of the inquiry, of course, is to
determine whether what Ackerman derides as a "mechanical jurisprudence" is what
the Court had in mind.
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identification of non-enumerated liberties.2 40 In fact, it appears Justice
Black, more than any other justice, understood that the New
Jurisprudential Deal committed the Court to rethinking the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment-and reconciling these two
dramatic moments of constitutional change. If the New Deal Court
legitimately foreclosed judicial enforcement of common law privileges
or immunities, Justice Black's "jot-for-jot" theory of incorporation
stands as the most principled approach to judicial review proposed by
the New Deal Supreme Court.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Distinguishing the New (Political) Deal from the New
(Jurisprudential) Deal
Viewing the New Deal in the light of the incorporation debates
reveals a revolution in judicial methodology, one which extended far
beyond the boundaries of commerce and liberty of contract. The New
Jurisprudential Deal applied to all aspects of the Court's work, from
the powers of Congress, to the autonomy of the states, to the limits of
judicially enforceable individual liberty.
The broad impact of the revolution may be the necessary result of
Court-driven constitutional reform.24 1 The political process failed to
produce a New Deal amendment. 42 If change was to come, it would
be by way of constitutional interpretation. This was all the Court had,
and to the New Deal appointees, all they needed.2 43 But there are
240. Akhil Amar criticizes Justice Black's jot-for-jot incorporation approach as
unduly restrictive, since it would exclude both important textual freedoms like the
writ of habeas corpus and other non-textual liberties. See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra
note 26, at 174-75. I believe that Black's theory leaves room for the incorporation of
textual liberties like habeas corpus, but not non-textual liberties.
241. One reason why there is no New Deal amendment is because the New Deal
Revolution did not involve a change in the text. Instead, it involved a change in the
Court's approach to texts already in place. That may seem like a distinction without a
difference, but there is a crucial difference between the two: the New Deal did not
change the idea of enumerated power, nor did it add a power not already granted (as
would, for example, judicial allowance for "laws respecting an establishment of
religion"). U.S. Const. amend. I. The Court's refusal to defer on other rights
continued to rely on texts already embedded in the Constitution. Finally, even
though the New Deal seemed to amend the potential reach of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, it did so by linking that clause to other texts in the Constitution.
It simply placed a rule of construction on the Clause limiting judicial interpretation to
norms contained within the four comers of the Constitution.
242. Given the general consensus that some kind of constitutional reform was
necessary, it seems likely that some kind of amendment would have been adopted had
the Court not initiated the "switch in time." See Ackerman, Transformations, supra
note 5, at 345-46, 348. On the other hand, the Court's revolution in jurisprudence
tracks the general criticism at the time that the problem was the Court and not the
Constitution.
243. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 180 ("[Tlhe immediate difficulty was with the
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consequences to choosing this method of reform. An amendment can
be limited to a particular problem, whether it is a broad restructuring
of federal-state relationships (the Reconstruction Amendments) or a
more surgical approach to a particular social issue (Prohibition). 2"
Altering the methods of judicial review, however, necessarily will
affect a broad range of doctrine.
Understanding the New Deal in reference to the political agenda of
Franklin Roosevelt treats the Revolution as if it had produced a
constitutional amendment. It views the Revolution as if it had
removed old rights (contract) or added new ones (government
welfare). A political focus, however, fails to account for aspects of the
Revolution that had nothing to do with the political goals of the New
Deal, the reversal of Swift and the restructuring of Meyer and Pierce
being only two examples. Most of all, it ignores the account provided
by the justices themselves. The political interpretation of the New
Deal must treat the Court's own explanations (text and original
intent) as, at best, window dressing or, at worst, dissembling. The
jurisprudential approach, on the other hand, not only accounts for
what the Court actually said, it also provides a more comprehensive
explanation for what it actually did.
Although the jurisprudential model in some ways broadens our
understanding of the Revolution, it also limits its scope. The New
Political Deal of Franklin Roosevelt involved the political goals of his
administration and contemporary views regarding the responsibilities
of modern government. The jurisprudential reforms of the New Deal
Court allowed the Democrats to pursue their experiments in social
welfare legislation. There was no intent, however, to constitutionalize
those experiments. Reading New Deal progressivism into the
Constitution would have repeated the same error of Lochner and
betrayed the patron saint of the New Deal, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
who insisted "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of
the citizen to the State or of laissez faire."' 45
Reading the New Deal as expanding opportunities for the Court to
intervene in the political process beyond those mandated by the text
fundamentally mistakes what the New Jurisprudential Deal was all
about!'4 After 1937, judicial interference with the political process
Justices, not the Court or the Constitution.").
244. While some of the amendments proposed by New Deal Democrats would
have restructured the nature of judicial review, others were limited to specific
regulatory powers. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
245. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
246. But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 138-39 (1993) (arguing that
the "New Deal Constitution" enacted a constitutional right to minimum welfare
entitlements). For a discussion regarding the substantial gap between the broad rights
talk of the 1936 campaign and the actual programs enacted by the later New Deal, see
William E. Forbath, Constitutional Change and the Politics of History, 108 Yale L.J.
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was justified only on the basis of an express constitutional mandate or
restriction. This core principle of the New Deal revolution informed
the Court's reversal of Swift v. Tyson,2 47 its deference to Congress
regarding the amendment process 248 and the commerce power,2 49 and
its limitation of due process rights to those "specifically expressed" in
the text of the Constitution2 0
B. Non-Textual Restrictions on Government Power
The jurisprudential revolution described in this paper is in tension
with a number of aspects of modern judicial review, including the
expansion of substantive due process' 51 and the deployment of non-
textual federalism principles to restrict the powers of the federal
government.212
1917, 1928 (1999) (describing how "social citizenship" legislation was thwarted by
Southern Dixiecrats). Forbath concludes "[w]e have enshrined the vast expansion of
national governmental power, but not the purpose for which it was expanded." Id. at
1929.
Bruce Ackerman, although generally declining to adopt any particular
interpretive conclusions, nevertheless appears to believe the New Deal
constitutionalized some form of Rooseveltian Social Welfare agenda. For example,
he cites the Reagan revolution as an example of a failed constitutional moment; a
failed attempt by President Reagan to "earn [the] authority from the People to
repudiate Darby and replace it with the laissez-faire vision expressed by Lochner and
Hammer." Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 376-77. This assumes, of
course, that embracing some form of laissez-faire requires a constitutional
amendment after the New Deal. The evidence, however, does not support any kind
of constitutionalization of positive welfare rights or a constitutional requirement that
the federal government "be all that it can be." The New Deal Revolution involved an
interpretive methodology that had the effect of expanding the discretion of the
legislature in areas not impinging on textual rights. There was no constitutional
mandate controlling how Congress utilized its discretion.
Ackerman also apparently believes that Reagan's opposition to Roe was an
attempt to change the Constitution, just as Roosevelt led popular opposition to the
pre-New Deal Constitution. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 402.
The more plausible account is that Reagan was attempting to enforce the New Deal
Court's embrace of textual originalism. A good argument can be made that it was the
Roe Court, if any, that had illegitimately altered the shape of the New Deal
Constitution.
247. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842).
248. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
249. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
250. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
251. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (regarding parental rights);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (regarding abortion).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). One might also include the expansive reading of
the Eleventh Amendment in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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When the Court reinvigorated non-textual substantive due process
in the 1960s, it characterized its efforts as reflecting an unbroken
tradition extending back to Meyer and Pierce. According to the
modern Court, 3 as well as most constitutional law texts and
treatises,- 4 non-textual substantive due process rights like privacy and
parental autonomy are rooted in the parental autonomy cases of the
1920s. These accounts discreetly leave Lochner out of the picture.
Even if the Court had abandoned Lochnerian liberty of contract, the
story goes, the Court never intended to abandon the general approach
to liberty represented by Meyer and Pierce.2 5-
That this account has survived, despite the New Deal Court's
abandonment of parental rights, and even despite the modern Court's
early candor that it was resurrecting an abandoned interpretation,! ' is
testament to the consequences of viewing the New Deal as a political,
instead of a jurisprudential, revolution. Once one focuses on the
actual words and actions of the New Deal Court, however, the
modem account collapses. Holmes,2-7 Roosevelt,2 CardozoY9
Stone,26 Frankfurter,61 Jackson 2 and Black 2 -all emphasized the
253. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
254. See, e.g., John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 389
(1991) ("[T]here was no real break in the use of a subjective test for finding individual
rights and liberties following the 1937 renouncement of substantive due process as a
control over economic and social welfare legislation."); Tribe, supra note 179, at 1318-
19.
255. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
761-62 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Nowak & Rotunda. supra note 254, at 389.
256. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); supra
notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
257. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
258. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Constitution of the United States Was a
Layman's Document, Not a Lawyer's Contract, Address on Constitution Day (Sept.
17, 1937), in 6 Roosevelt Public Papers, supra note 86, at 366 ("Yet nearly every
attempt to meet those demands for social and economic betterment has been
jeopardized or actually forbidden by those who have sought to read into the
Constitution language which the framers refused to write into the Constitution.").
259. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) ("In these and other
situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the
specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty....").
260. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There
may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
261. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 666 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Before a duly enacted law can be judicially nullified, it
must be forbidden by some explicit restriction upon political authority in the
Constitution.").
262. See id. at 639 ("Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears
when the specific provisions of the First [Amendment] become its standard.").
263. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
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role of text in distinguishing Lochner from legitimate interpretation of
due process. To the New Deal Court, parental rights were no more
legitimate than contract rights. Meyer and Pierce survived the refining
fire of the New Deal only to the extent that they could be linked to
"specific expressions" in the Constitution. If non-textual substantive
due process survived the New Deal, it is because the Court's attempt
to abandon this methodology was unjustified. This was not, however,
their intent.2"
But limiting the justification for judicial review is a two-edged
sword. Even as it excised Lochnerian contract rights due to lack of
textual mandate, the Supreme Court also abandoned state autonomy
rationales for restricting the commerce power. The Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments do not expressly restrict the powers of
government.265 The Tenth Amendment "states but a truism" that
powers not granted are reserved to the states.266  Eleventh
Amendment state immunity doctrine is not based on the actual text of
the amendment, but on an implied principle of state sovereignty-a
principle articulated by the Lochner Era Court in the 1890 case, Hans
Black wrote:
And I further contend that the "natural law" formula which the Court uses
to reach its conclusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous
excrescence on our Constitution. I believe that formula to be itself a
violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the
expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where
no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power.
Id.
264. Ackerman acknowledges the tension between the non-textual right of privacy
and the "specifics" language of Carolene Products Footnote Four but raises the
possibility that non-textual rights may be a preferable way to synthesize the
Constitution's protection of liberty under the Founding, Reconstruction and New
Deal constitutions. Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5, at 129-30. Ackerman does
not, however, expressly resolve the issue. Id. at 159 ("[M]y aim here has been to begin
a story, not to end it."). In We the People: Transformations, Ackerman suggests that
the Reagan and Bush Administrations' attempt to overrule Roe was a failed
"constitutional moment." Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 398-99.
Ackerman thus both grants the right to privacy constitutional status and implies that
the legitimacy of Roe and the right to privacy is intimately connected to the
constitutional status of the New Deal. Id. at 402. Ackerman has not expressly
repudiated the option of embracing the New Deal and Footnote Four, while rejecting
the concept of non-textual fundamental liberties, though he may do so in the future.
See id. at 403 ("My next volume ... will try to clarify the judicial challenges that lie
ahead.").
265. But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
266. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). There may still be limits on
the commerce power even absent Tenth Amendment considerations. John Marshall,
for example, indicated that Congress should not be allowed to use its enumerated
powers as a pretext to regulate matters not entrusted to the national government. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819); infra note 278 (discussing
the distinction between the New Deal Court's reading of Marshall and the actual
views of Marshall); cf. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States.").
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v. Louisiana.'67 The modern Supreme Court increasingly relies on the
implied principles of federalism to restrict the powers of the federal
goverment.26s It is difficult to reconcile this approach, however, with
the New Deal Court's rejection of implied restrictions on the powers
of government.269
C. Reconciling the Fourteenth Amendment with the New Deal
Determining the original meaning of the New Deal Revolution is
not the same thing as establishing its legitimacy. Even if I have
accurately traced the intentions of the New Deal Court, their actions
nevertheless may have amounted to an abuse of judicial power. If so,
their efforts deserve more our derision than our continued fidelity.
The work of Bruce Ackerman, as well as his critics, regarding the
constitutional status of the New Deal are essential to our determining
whether a legitimate constitutional revolution occurred. It is not my
purpose to join that debate, only to note its importance.
The effort of this article is to determine what the New Deal
Revolution was about in order to more fully appreciate what is at
stake in current debates over the legitimacy of the Revolution. If the
New Deal was a legitimate moment of constitutional change, then we
must confront the only text we have, the opinions themselves, and
grapple with the intentions of its Framers-the members of the New
Deal Court. It appears their intent was to restructure the process of
judicial review around the principles of textual originalism. Even if
only a jurisprudential change, this had the effect of changing the shape
of individual liberty. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was
adopted against the background of a common law judicial
methodology which likely included economic liberty. Removing that
background amounted to removing an anticipated aspect of
Fourteenth Amendment liberty. This is why determining the
constitutional status of the New Deal is critical to understanding the
modern scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reconciling the original meaning of the New Deal Revolution with
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment leads to what
seem like jarring results. Embracing the New Deal appears to entail
rejecting non-textual substantive due process and the implied
restrictions of federalism. Rejecting the New Deal leaves federalism
in place, but also non-textual common law rights under the Privileges
267. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
268. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (striking
down portion of the Americans with Disabilities Act applicable to the states).
269. One way to view the Court's moves in regard to the commerce power is to
read that clause at a high level of abstraction. See Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction,
supra note 43, at 318. Another way, of course, is to see the Court as reading the
Tenth Amendment at the lowest and most specific level of abstraction. This approach
is more in keeping with the Court's moves regarding the Due Process Clause.
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or Immunities Clause.27 This seems jarring because those who reject
non-textual substantive due process generally question the legitimacy
of the New Deal Revolution and embrace the implied restrictions of
federalism.2 71  On the other hand, those who favor a broad
interpretation of substantive due process liberty generally embrace
the (political) principles of the New Deal and reject federalism-based
restrictions on the regulatory powers of government.272  Under the
account traced in this paper, however, retaining modern substantive
due process requires, at the very least, delegitimizing critical aspects
of the New Deal critique of Lochner. 73
D. Originalism and the New Deal
Having rejected the common law as a basis for judicial intervention
in the political process, it seems only natural that the Court would
270. Some scholars have tentatively suggested that state and federal power to
regulate the economy might have been in place prior to the New Deal due to the
combined impact of the "progressive" amendments of the first decades of the
twentieth century. For example, twentieth century amendments like the Sixteenth
(progressive income tax), Seventeenth (election of Senators) and Nineteenth
(women's vote) collectively contain themes of nationalism and economic
redistribution-major themes of the New Deal. See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note
26, at 300; see also Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note
42, at 97. Although Professor Amar expressly declines to take a position, he suggests
that these amendments in themselves might justify the Court's expansion of
government power to enact economic and social welfare legislation. Amar, Bill of
Rights, supra note 26, at 300. Not having investigated the public understanding of the
intended scope of these amendments, I simply note that not even the most ardent
supporters of the New Deal appointed to the Court suggested the revolution could be
accomplished by way of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth or Nineteenth Amendments.
271. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia generally fall into this camp. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting the reach of the commerce
power); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (rejecting the asserted due
process right to abortion). Justice Thomas has been the most vocal opponent of New
Deal regulatory power. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(rejecting New Deal expansion of the commerce power). He is also generally
suspicious of non-textual substantive due process rights. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 953
(joining Rehnquist's and Scalia's dissents). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (Rehnquist and Thomas voting in favor of parental rights).
272. Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer fit this type. See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57
(Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer voting in support of due process parental rights);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 655 (Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 843 (Souter joining the plurality). Academic commentary
generally reflects the same breakdown. See, e.g., Ackerman, Transformations, supra
note 5 at 390, 402 (implying that Republican efforts to roll back New Deal commerce
power and opposition to abortion rights are both in conflict with the New Deal
Constitution).
273. Some scholars appear to realize this. See 8 History of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910, at 12 (Owen
M. Fiss ed., 1993) (suggesting the Lochner Court shares some affinity with the current
Court's enforcement of privacy rights, and that the Lochner Court, in significant
respects, has been unfairly maligned).
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turn to originalism as an interpretive method. The Court had long
referred to the original intentions of the Framers, even if not as an
exclusive source of constitutional norms.2 74 Moreover, given the
critique of Lochner as unduly opening the door to judicial
policymaking, it is not surprising that the New Deal Court declined
Chief Justice Hughes's invitation to use Changed Circumstances
Doctrine as a measure for judicial review.275 The most viable
alternative to originalism, political process theory, substantially
undermined the very idea of an enforceable constitution. "  To the
extent that one views the "switch in time" as at least partially
motivated by justices who wanted to preserve the independence of the
Court, it makes sense that consensus formed around textual
originalism and not the political process model.
The modem search for original meaning arose out of an effort by
the Court to replace common law methodology with something that
both the Court and the public could accept as a more legitimate
ground for judicial review." Originalism is a major theme of the New
Deal Convention. It became the touchstone for interpretation of the
Commerce Clause,278 and it eventually dominated the debate over
274. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see
also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219-20 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[The
Sixteenth Amendment should be read in 'a sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption."' (citation omitted)).
275. As Frankfurter described it, this would throw the Court back on a mere
"subjective test." See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
276. Or, as Ackerman might put it, it would have moved us away from a dualist
constitution and towards more of a monist parliamentarian system of government. See
Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5, at 13-17.
277. Textual originalism is not "strict constructionism," if by that is meant an
interpretive method which restricts both the courts and the legislature. The textual
originalism of the New Deal opened the door to the modern welfare state, and the
rejection of the political process model preserved "judicial activism" on behalf of
"preferred" textual rights. This is not a theory of limited government and judicial
pacifism.
278. The Court embraced what it believed was Marshall's view of the commerce
power. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. The implication is that
Marshall's view best represents the view of the Founders. Putting aside the issue of
whether one can equate Marshall's interpretations with the Founders' intent, there is
some question whether Marshall would have permitted the power of government to
extend as far as did the New Deal Court. For example, Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch contained a paragraph never quoted by the New Deal Court indicating
that Congress could not use its enumerated powers as a pretext to regulate matters
not delegated to the national government. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. Marshall
wrote:
[O]r should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a
decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.
Id.
If there is a distinction between the New Deal view of original intent, and
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incorporation as Justices Frankfurter and Black sparred over the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9  The first
significant efforts to determine the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment came about as a result of the Court's struggle to
reconcile incorporation with post-Lochner review. 280 In 1949, Charles
Fairman, a protrg6 of Justice Frankfurter,28' published the first major
work on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,282 the
first in a long line of articles exploring the original understanding of
the Reconstruction Amendments.3 The forefathers of the modern
search for original meaning are neither the Founders,284 nor
actual original intent, which should control? If the New Deal Court truly embraced
originalism, then shouldn't the true views of the Founders trump the erroneous views
of later Courts? If the New Deal Revolution was in fact a revolution in jurisprudence,
then I believe the actual original intent should control. Enforcing the pretext
paragraph does not necessarily call into question the basic structure of New Deal
legislation, though it might limit the extension of the commerce power to commercial
activities. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
279. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)
280. See Richard L. Aynes, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Seven Deadly Sins of Legal Scholarship, 8 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 407, 433 (2000)
(asserting that from the debate between Professor Fairman and Justice Black "came a
better appreciation for the [Fourteenth] Amendment than perhaps had ever existed
since its ratification"). In his article, Aynes notes how Fairman's antipathy to
incorporation was due in part to his New Deal Philosophy-and opposition to
Lochner. Id. at 424.
281. See Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1197 (1995).
282. Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 28.
283. See Crosskey, supra note 26; Morrison, supra note 42; see also Fairman, Reply,
supra note 28. For more recent efforts, see Berger, Fourteenth Amendment, supra
note 28; Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment 134 (1977); Curtis, No State, supra note 26; Raoul Berger,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 Ohio St.
L.J. 1 (1983); Berger, Nine-Lived Cat, supra note 28; Michael Kent Curtis, Further
Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 89 (1982); Michael Kent Curtis, Still Further Adventures
of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Rebuttal to Raoul Berger's Reply on Application of the Bill of
Rights to the States, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 517 (1984); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of
Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 45 (1980); Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Bill of Rights, 14 Conn. L. Rev. 237 (1982). The most recent work is Akhil Amar's,
The Bill of Rights. Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26; see also John Raeburn Green,
The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Mich. L.
Rev. 869 (1948) (supporting Justice Black's theory of incorporation).
284. Opponents of originalism stress the failure to find support for that
methodology in the writings of the "original" Founders. See Leonard W. Levy,
Judgments: Essays on American Constitutional History 17-18 (1972); Jack N. Rakove,
Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 3-22 (1996);
Powell, supra note 21, at 902-03; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1176-77 (1987). Original intent as a central
focus of interpretation clearly has a more recent vintage. There was little reason to
embrace originalism in a time when judges discovered law and did not make it. When
the law was a brooding omnipresence waiting for an ever-clearer explication under
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contemporary conservatives like Edwin Meese and Robert Bork,2 -
but Justices Stone, Jackson, Frankfurter and Black.'t
One could argue that the Court's use of originalism was merely
rhetorical-a judicially constructed myth 7 intended to justify the
Revolution, but distinguishable from the actual (political) substance
of the Revolution. Revolutionaries, after all, often claim their goal is
a restoration of first principles, a return to the glorious past.2s
Assuming that the Court acted in good faith, perhaps the rhetoric of
originalism signaled that the Revolution remained in continuity with
the ideals of the Founding, even as it constructed an entirely new
understanding of the political responsibilities of government. '
This instrumentalist explanation for New Deal originalism confuses
the political goals of Roosevelt with the jurisprudential goals of the
Court. According to critics of the Lochner Court, the problem was
not the Constitution, it was the erroneous interpretive method of Nine
Old Men.'9 The mandate of the New Deal Court was to lead a
revolution in jurisprudence, one that focused on what the Court was
doing wrong and would ensure they not do it again. To dismiss the
Court's embrace of originalism as mere rhetoric is to miss what the
Revolution was all about-the task of building a new and legitimate
method of judicial review. Textual originalism was more than a
"cover" for the Revolution. It was the Revolution." t
the common law, it made perfect sense to range beyond both text and original intent
in framing the scope of "liberty." With the advent of the twentieth century, it became
ever more difficult to justify the use of such wide-ranging judicial tools.
285. See Bork, supra note 21; Edwin Meese. III, Interpreting the Constiittion, in
Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over Original Intent 13 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1990).
286. And, perhaps, Justice Holmes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219-20
(1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
287. Bruce Ackerman makes an argument along these lines when he describes the
Court as having manufactured a "Myth of Rediscovery" which, since 1937, has
become part of our professional narrative regarding the New Deal. See Ackerman.
Foundations, supra note 5, at 47; Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5. at 259;
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 183-84 (Greenwood Press 1982) (1963).
288. Most recently Ackerman has described the New Deal as a "revolution on a
human scale" in which the revolutionary leaders do not make a total and violent
break with the past but attempt instead to ground the revolution in the ideals and
legal forms of the past. See Ackerman, Human Scale, supra note 136.
289. Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 259.
290. Pearson & Allen, supra note 75, at 70-71; Jackson, supra note 11, at 53; see
also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 9
1937), in Jackson, supra note 11, at 340. Roosevelt stated:
And remember one thing more. Even if an amendment were passed. and
even if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would depend
upon the kind of Justices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench.
An amendment like the rest of the Constitution is what the Justices say it is
rather than what its framers or you might hope it is.
Id. at 350.
291. The instrumentalist account of the New Deal fits with the standard externalist
account, in vogue for so many years, that the Court had bowed to political pressure,
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The Court faced the profoundly difficult task of changing the
direction of constitutional law without the mandate of an amendment
and with the duty to provide principled explanations for the dramatic
change. This was the task that disturbed the self-confidence of the
Court. The solution, textual originalism, in many ways was a brilliant
move of Marburian proportions: the Court rescued itself from
political attack by declining power, but doing so in a manner that
preserved the Court's essential role as an independent branch of
government.292 The political astuteness of the effort, however, cannot
obscure the fact that the Court altered the substance of the
Constitution and revolutionized the method of judicial review.
The Fourteenth Amendment and the New Deal generally are
studied in isolation from each other. 93 If the above analysis is correct,
one period cannot be fully understood without considering the impact
of both periods. Given the recent advances in our historical
understanding of the Founding,294 Reconstruction295 and the New
thus making their opinions nothing more than window dressing. For the reasons
given above, I think this approach cannot be reconciled either with what the justices
actually said they were doing or with what they actually did. Internalist accounts
which view the Revolution in terms of evolutionary development of doctrine similarly
fail to engage either the debates of the New Deal Court, or what the Court actually
did. Internalists generally minimize the revolutionary aspects of the New Deal and
focus on pre-New Deal indicators of a gradual shift in jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Cushman, supra note 5, at 154 (arguing that the real "revolution" occurred in
Nebbia).
292. Both Marbury and the New Deal Revolution involved a Court under attack
from the executive branch. Both took place in a political context which included
threats of impeachment for Supreme Court justices and congressional efforts to limit
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Both involved critical moments in time where
the wrong move by the Court would likely have seriously damaged its future role as
an independent branch of government. Both involved creative judicial actions which
saved the day. Both actions involved a denial of judicial power in a manner that had
the effect both establishing and preserving the basis for judicial review in the future.
Both used dicta to establish the power of judicial review.
293. Some Fourteenth Amendment legal historians either ignore or dismiss the
relevance of the New Deal to understanding the modern scope of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. This approach, of
course, requires ignoring or downplaying the economic rights aspect of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Scholarship regarding the meaning of the New Deal
Revolution generally accepts the legitimacy of the incorporation project without
questioning the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ackerman,
Liberating Abstraction, supra note 43, at 331. The New Deal Court's focus on textual
rights allowed it to distinguish non-textual Lochnerian contract rights. But reading
the "texts" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause requires an additional
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment-a theory conspicuously missing from the
Court's jurisprudence in 1937. This is why defining post-Lochner individual liberties
triggered the first serious judicial debates regarding the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment since Reconstruction. See supra Part II. This is also why a modern
understanding of the post-Lochner Constitution requires a comprehensive account of
both Reconstruction and the New Deal.
294. See, e.g., Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5; Amar, Bill of Rights, supra
note 26; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969) [hereinafter
Wood, Creation]; Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1993).
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Deal,296 the time seems right for a comprehensive originalist account
of the Constitution.297
CONCLUSION:
THE SUPREME COURT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
In 1787, Congress authorized a convention to meet in Philadelphia
for "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation. ' 298  The Philadelphia Convention ignored that
mandate and drafted an entirely new Constitution. After debating
various drafts, the Constitution ultimately submitted to the states for
ratification disregarded prior rules for constitutional amendmentm
and violated the clear intentions (and instructions) of many who had
agreed to a convention in the first place.3 Such is the independence
of constitutional conventions.30 1
The New Deal Revolution in many ways parallels the Philadelphia
Convention. The immediate concern which generated calls for
constitutional reform involved barriers to economic reform.- z
Distinguished politicians were appointed with the very public
expectation they would restructure the constitutional rules in a
I also have explored the original meaning of the First Amendment. See Lash, Power
and Religion, supra note 29.
295. See, e.g., Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 26; Curtis, No State, supra note 26;
Aynes, Misreading John Bingharn, supra note 26; Harrison, supra note 235; see also
Lash, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 29.
296. See, e.g., Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5; Ackerman, Transformations,
supra note 5; Cushman, supra note 5.
297. Fourteenth Amendment scholars generally decline to address economic rights,
much less the New Deal. See, e.g., supra note 42 (critiquing Michael Curtis's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). New Deal scholars generally avoid
the debate regarding the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra
note 293. The lack of a comprehensive theory is probably explainable both as a
matter of focus and an implicit judgment of irrelevance.
298. Report of Proceedings in Congress, Wednesday, February 21, 1787, in
Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, H.R.
Doc. No. 69-398, at 46 (1927).
299. Submission of the Constitution to the states violated prior rules for
amendment by ignoring the requirement of unanimous consent by the states for any
amendments. See Ackerman, Transformations, supra note 5, at 51.
300. Delaware instructed its delegates to not agree to any proposal that violated
the equal voting power it enjoyed under the Articles. See Ackerman,
Transformations, supra note 5, at 35. This was violated not only by the method of
ratification, but also by basing representation in the House on population.
301. If only to avoid a second such open-ended convention, Madison agreed to
propose a Bill of Rights in the First Congress. See Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting
Conventional Wisdom. Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing and Implementation of
Article V, 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 197, 221 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Rejecting
Conventional Wisdonz].
302. All legislation required unanimous consent by the states, as did amending the
Articles. This prevented Congress from responding to trade wars and the fiscal needs
of a new country heavily in debt.
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manner that would allow economic reform to proceed. As in
Philadelphia, the New Deal Convention met the immediate needs of
the country by way of constitutional reform which went far beyond
the narrow range of economic concerns which triggered the
convention. As in Philadelphia, hammering out the details of this
reform required serious and extended debate. 3  Drafts were
proposed and rejected.3°4  Consensus emerged on some matters,
others remained in deadlock. The ultimate draft reflects a mixture of
consistent principle and uneasy compromise.
Whether the Court's efforts can be justified, either according to the
principles of political morality or as a subtle recapitulation of Article
V procedure, is a matter of ongoing dispute.305 This article is an effort
to see more clearly the text of the Revolution and to better
understand the original intentions of the New Deal Convention. At
least this way we can have a clearer picture of what the dispute is
about.
Stalking the literature of constitutional conventions is the specter of
the "run away convention. ' 3"" According to the principles of popular
303. See Kalman, Law, Politics, supra note 100, at 2193-95.
304. Bruce Ackerman has argued that judicial opinions following fundamental
moments of constitutional change go through "phases." In "Phase 1," the intended
revolution in the constitutional status quo meets resistance when it is first interpreted
by the Supreme Court. Justices educated under the prior regime resist the broader
implications of the law and interpret it in an unduly restrictive manner. Ackerman
calls this phase one of "particularistic synthesis." See Ackerman, Foundations, supra
note 5, at 98. It is only later, in "Phase 2," that justices, now having professional
experience in the new regime, gain the critical distance necessary to see the revolution
for what it was and fully synthesize the new constitutional rules into previous
constitutional moments. Ackerman refers to this second phase of judicial
interpretation as "comprehensive synthesis." Id.
Whatever the merits of this approach in understanding prior moments of
constitutional change (it does seem to explain the Slaughterhouse Cases), it is hard to
see how it can account for what occurred under the New Deal Court. In this case,
what Ackerman would call "particularistic" and "comprehensive" opinions were both
written by justices educated in the same generation. Indeed, some of the broadest
interpretations of the Revolution are found in the intitial opinions written by Chief
Justice Hughes (the Changed Circumstances Doctrine), and Felix Frankfurter (the
political process model). See supra Parts II.B, III.A. and accompanying text. It also
seems anachronistic to credit opinions like Barnette with integrating the New Deal
with the Fourteenth Amendment, when there was no consensus at that time regarding
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra Parts III.B-E; cf. Ackerman,
Liberating Abstraction, supra note 43, at 328-30 (discussing the significance of
Barnette). Finally, even if the above objections could be overcome, there is a more
fundamental reason why Ackerman's Phase 1 and 2 synthesis theory is inapplicable to
the New Deal. Unlike prior moments, where the Court initially resisted the radical
intentions of the reformers, in this case the Supreme Court itself was the reformer.
The Court was not struggling to make sense of the Revolution-it was drafting the
Revolution.
305. For a recent collection of modem arguments regarding the status of the New
Deal, see Symposium, Moments of Change, supra note 6.
306. See Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinkmanship: Amending the
Constitution by National Convention (1988).
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sovereignty, conventions stand as sovereign meetings of the People
themselves and, as such, are not subject to outside limitations." A
convention called to consider a flag burning amendment may decide
to propose amending the constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
Nor are there limits to the length of time a convention may sit with
the authority to propose fundamental constitutional change. In 1948,
Israel convened a convention in order to propose a constitution for
the new country.' It was called the Knesset. :  It still sits. It is
perhaps this inability to control the length or scope of a convention
that has made it such a rare occurrence in American history.31"
Understanding the New Deal Court as a constitutional convention
then is a sobering thought. Perhaps we are right to fiercely debate
each new appointment to the Supreme Court. A convention was
called in 1937. It still sits.
307. Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 5. at 195 (discussing the relationship
between conventions and "acting outside the rules"); see also Wood, Creation, supra
note 294, at 309.
308. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the
United States (1993).
309. Id
310. See Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom, supra note 301, at 228-29.
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